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Foreword
The idea that governments should create jobs for the unemployed has 
been assailed in U.S. politics in recent years as unworkable and wasteful, 
if not downright un-American. The biggest domestic budget cut (outside 
of the welfare field) achieved by President Reagan in 1981, his first year 
in office, was due to the elimination of the public service employment 
program under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act 
(GETA). The program had already been trimmed in the Carter years 
from its post-recession peak in fiscal year 1979 of $4.1 billion on an 
annual basis. Hardly a murmur of dissent was heard in 1981 when the 
public service employment program was eliminated; CETA was describ 
ed in this period by one critic as a "four-letter word," having the obvious 
connotation that one should not use it in polite society.
In light of this history, it is noteworthy that this book, culminating five 
years of research on the CETA public service jobs program, has good 
things to say about the program, rebutting some of the most common 
broadside criticisms. The book is based on field research in 40 state and 
local governmental jurisdictions and related studies. The research, con 
ducted initially at the Brookings Institution, was completed at the 
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs of 
Princeton University. This volume brings together for the first time the 
findings of all four rounds of field research conducted in July 1977, 
December 1977, December 1979 and December 1980. The sample includ 
ed 40 jurisdictions covered by one or more field associate. The field 
researchers, mostly academic social scientists based at universities 
located in the jurisdictions being studied, collected program and budget 
data from a wide range of sources and conducted extensive interviews. 
Their findings, as summarized here by Robert F. Cook, Charles F. 
Adams, Jr., and V. Lane Rawlins, show that the CETA public service 
jobs program worked—and, in fact, worked well during the 1976-78 
period when there was "a good pool of trainees, real and important jobs 
to be learned, and employers who cared about getting the workers train 
ed." Displacement (that is, the use of CETA job funds to pay for jobs 
that would have existed anyway) was found to be relatively low in this 
period.
The authors of this volume conclude further that a public service jobs 
program narrowly targeted on the most disadvantaged workers, which is 
what the program was modified to do in 1978, was not an effective 
strategy, primarily because employers (state and local governments and 
nonprofit organizations) no longer had as much incentive to make 
"good" use of the program for "real" jobs. The research in this case
draws heavily on the institutional analyses by the field researchers, which 
are effectively integrated with impact analyses based both on field and 
statistical research techniques.
We need to pay close attention to these results in the current period. 
Although most observers of the domestic policy scene (even close 
observers) will tell you that the public service jobs approach was 
discredited and has been abandoned, there is, in effect, a new form of 
public service employment today focused on disadvantaged workers in 
the form of the "workfare" approach to welfare reform. This "work- 
for-your-welfare" idea was adopted by the Congress on a trial basis for 
the Aid to Families with Dependent Chidren (AFDC) program in 1981 at 
the request of President Reagan. This job-oriented approach to welfare 
reform is currently being tested in more than half of the states (generally 
limited to selected counties). It already shows promise as a basic institu 
tional reform strategy for the welfare system (i.e., to make the system 
more strongly oriented to employment, self-sufficiency, and skill acquisi 
tion and enhancement). As we experiment with this employment and 
training approach to welfare reform, we will be well advised to pay close 
attention to the experience of earlier programs, including the mammoth 
CETA public service jobs program of the seventies ably described in this 
volume.
Richard P. Nathan
San Francisco, California 
August 10, 1985
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Preface
This book draws together research findings on the implementation and 
impact of public service employment as a major part of the nation's 
employment and training policy from 1971 to 1982.
The concept of public service employment can be simply stated. A 
significant number of people for one reason or another have a hard time 
finding jobs in private firms. One way the federal government can 
alleviate the problem of unemployment is to subsidize positions that 
these people can fill in state and local governments. This approach not 
only helps the previously unemployed gain skills and experience that may 
enable them to obtain unsubsidized employment, but also helps par 
ticipating governments provide useful services for their citizens.
Though the concept in these bare essentials is fairly simple, those who 
legislate and implement a public service jobs program must confront a 
large number of complex issues. One overriding issue is the determina 
tion of program objectives and what relative weight each will have. Other 
issues include how money will be distributed, what kinds of people will 
be eligible for subsidized jobs, what restrictions will be imposed on par 
ticipating government agencies in their use of subsidized workers, how 
much workers can be paid, and so on. During the decade that public ser 
vice employment was emphasized in employment policy, more than one 
approach was tried for practically every aspect of the program's design. 
A basic purpose of this volume is to show how these various approaches 
affected the outcomes of the program.
The analysis presented here is based primarily on a longitudinal field 
evaluation study of 40 local governments and their implementation of 
the public service employment (PSE) component of the Comprehensive 
Employment and Training Act of 1973 (CETA). These field studies 
began in 1977, in response to a congressional mandate that the National 
Commission on Employment Policy sponsor a study of the "net employ 
ment effects" of the PSE program. The question that Congress was in 
terested in at the time was how many PSE jobs were newly created posi 
tions, as Congress had intended, rather than simply federally subsidized 
replacements for positions that local governments would otherwise have 
funded with their own money. Later phases of the research considered a 
wide range of topics in addition to the net employment question.
The studies were undertaken by the Brookings Institution and later 
transferred to the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International 
Affairs at Princeton University. At both Brookings and Princeton, the 
research was directed by Richard P. Nathan. The project resulted in four
vn
major reports submitted to the U.S. Department of Labor, as well as 
several other published works by project staff.
Field Evaluation Methodology
The PSE program was designed in Washington but implemented in 
hundreds of localities around the country. Any effort to understand how 
it operated and what effects it had must assemble and analyze evidence 
gathered at the local level to draw valid general conclusions that apply to 
the entire nation. It was with such requirements in mind that the field 
evaluation methodology was designed.
This approach has been used for studies of two other programs of 
federal grants to states and local governments General Revenue Shar 
ing and Community Development Block Grants. 1 These two research 
projects as well as the PSE study used a network of "field associates," 
who are economists or political scientists at universities or research in 
stitutions in the areas of the jurisdictions to be studied. Each field 
associate is a specialist in some aspect of intergovernmental grant 
research, such as labor economics, state and local finance, public ad 
ministration, or intergovernmental relations. Each is also familiar with 
the operation of the program under study in the jurisdiction he or she 
reports on. As a result, the field associates are conversant with both the 
national policy questions related to the study and the local operation of 
the program under examination.
The field associates work in conjunction with the central staff of the 
project. For each field observation, the associates and the central staff 
meet to reach a common understanding of what issues are to be address 
ed and what types of information are needed. On the basis of this 
understanding, the central staff draws up a report form to guide the 
associates in their work. The form is neither an interview protocol nor a 
survey of responses of particular local actors. Rather, it is an outline of 
the questions that each associate must answer on the basis of the infor 
mation he or she has gathered. Each associate is responsible for identify 
ing the persons who should be interviewed and the other sources of infor 
mation that should be used. Although members of the central staff may 
ask for clarifications and additional information, the analysis of the 
local situation is the responsibility of each associate.
After the central staff has received completed report forms from all 
associates and has obtained needed clarifications, members of the central 
staff (often in conjunction with some of the field associates) draft a 
report that attempts to generalize from the individual associate reports. 
All field associates have a chance to offer comments on this draft, and it 
is then revised and submitted as a product of the study.
vin
Four rounds of observations were performed in the PSE study in Ju 
ly 1977, December 1977, December 1979, and December 1980. Approx 
imately 40 associates, covering 40 state and local jurisdictions, were in 
volved in the study.
The Goal of This Report
Public policy sometimes goes in cycles. A political consensus is reach 
ed that "government should do something" about a social or economic 
problem. A program is devised to deal with the problem. After a time, 
the program comes to an end. When a similar problem later arises, all 
too often a brand new solution is devised, with little or no reference to 
the lessons that can be learned from the past.
Policymakers seeking to confront the problems of today typically fail 
to consult the nation's "institutional memory" about the policy in 
itiatives of yesterday because of misperceptions about what those pro 
grams actually accomplished. When employment and training programs 
of the 1960s and 1970s were being designed, for example, hardly anyone 
fully appreciated the scope of the contributions that the work programs 
of the 1930s had made to American life. The Works Progress Ad 
ministration produced a series of volumes on the economic history of 
major American rivers, but it failed to produce a contemporary record of 
the hundreds of projects it supported. As a result, the public memory of 
such programs was shrouded in political rhetoric, much of it condemning 
them as "make work." Yet their accomplishments aside from protec 
ting millions of American families from destitution were real and 
lasting, as anyone can attest who has visited one of the thousands of 
public libraries built by WPA workers, flown into LaGuardia Airport in 
New York City, also built by WPA workers, or hiked in state parks that 
were reforested by the Civilian Conservation Corps.
Although the public service employment program came to an end only 
a few years ago, we believe it has already met a fate similar to that of the 
Depression-era programs. We believe there is a need to go beyond the 
contemporary rhetoric and provide a dispassionate assessment of the 
strengths and weaknesses of this program. If the need for subsidized 
public service jobs should again arise, as we believe it may, the record 
will be available to those who care to learn from it.
NOTE
1. See Richard P. Nathan et al., Monitoring Revenue Sharing (Washington, DC: The 
Brookings Institution, 1975); Richard P. Nathan, Charles F. Adams, Jr., and Associates, 
Revenue Sharing: The Second Round (Brookings, 1977); and Paul R. Dommel et al., 
Targeting Community Development (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development, 1980). For details on the field evaluation method, see Richard P. 
Nathan, "The Methodology for Field Network Evaluation Studies," in Walter Williams, 
ed., Studying Implementation (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1982).
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The Public Service 
Employment Program
At various times during the 1970s, public service job pro 
grams were seen by various people as a solution to long term 
unemployment among technologically displaced and/or un 
skilled people, as a strategy to combat short term unemploy 
ment caused by economic downturns, as an alternative to 
welfare, and as a scandal-ridden failure.
The programs were none of these things, yet each view has 
an element of truth. Public service jobs programs could be 
viewed from many different perspectives for two main 
reasons. First, they had multiple objectives, and different 
observers could judge the programs by different criteria. 
Second, the programs were undergoing almost continuous 
change. Information gathered in one year might not apply to 
the program in the following year.
This chapter describes the objectives and design of the 
Public Employment Program (PEP) of 1971 and its suc 
cessor, the Public Service Employment (PSE) components of 
the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973 
(GETA). It begins by sketching the background to these pro 
grams, as set in the 1930s and 1960s.
Background
The Works Progress Administration (WPA), begun in 
1935 as one of Franklin D. Roosevelt's responses to the 
Great Depression, established the precedent of direct federal
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government involvement in countering widespread 
unemployment. At its peak, it employed more than 3 million 
people while more than 9 million were unemployed. It 
distributed an average of $1.4 billion per year until its end in 
1943.'
Partly because WPA set a precedent by involving the 
federal government in efforts to directly reduce unemploy 
ment, it was a controversial program. Its opponents 
castigated it as "leaf raking" and "the dole," but since that 
time many have come to appreciate the amount of produc 
tive output the program supported. 2
Despite its obvious similarities to the public service 
employment programs of the 1970s, WPA differed from 
them in two important respects. First, its primary objective 
was to replace household income lost when a breadwinner 
was laid off. (Unemployment compensation was not provid 
ed nationwide until 1938.) Only one worker in a family could 
hold a WPA job; workers did not receive ordinary wages, 
but were given an amount equal to the difference between 
any other income and what the government determined to be 
their "need." Second, WPA was administered directly by 
the federal government, with a federal administrator in each 
locality, rather than by state or local governments.
Programs of the 1960s
Mobilization for World War II eliminated the unemploy 
ment problem of the depression, and for a decade after the 
war joblessness was not a major issue. The government pro 
vided a year's worth of unemployment compensation to 
returning vetrans; a business boom absorbed civilians 
thrown out of work in defense industries; and the Korean 
War, which began in 1950, ended a mild recession that had 
started in late 1948. The end of the Korean conflict in 1953 
brought a downturn, but it turned out to be brief. 3
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Calls for government efforts to stimulate the economy and 
create jobs began to be heard, however, when a sluggish 
economy from 1957 through 1960 brought persistently high 
unemployment levels. Further impetus for action arose from 
concerns that many people would be thrown out of work by 
the effects of automation resulting from the technological 
advances of the previous two decades.
Soon after the Kennedy administration took office, Con 
gress in 1961 approved the Area Redevelopment Act. It com 
bined loans and other incentives for firms to expand in 
dustrial facilities in economically depressed areas with voca 
tional education programs intended to assure industries of a 
trained workforce in those areas. With a new economic 
downturn in 1961, however, the program proved to be too 
small to create many jobs, and the training component never 
exceeded 12,000 persons through the program's end in 1965.
A much more ambitious effort began in 1962, when the 
Kennedy administration won passage of the Manpower 
Development and Training Act (MDTA). It focused on 
training, especially the retraining of workers whose skills did 
not fit the changing needs of the economy. The largest part 
of the training was done by educational institutions and local 
community agencies; the number of persons receiving such 
training rose from 32,000 in fiscal year 1963 to a peak of 
177,500 in fiscal year 1966. The program also made an effort 
to place unemployed people in jobs with private firms where 
they could receive on-the-job training. The firms were given 
subsidies to cover the extra costs of hiring unskilled workers. 
Private social action organizations received grants to find 
firms that were willing to participate. This portion of the 
MDTA program grew at first, but the Johnson administra 
tion's 1964 declaration of a War on Poverty gave MDTA a 
new focus on the poor rather than the more general mandate 
to meet the training needs of the unskilled and technological 
ly displaced.
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The opening salvo of the war on poverty came with the 
passage of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. This act 
and its subsequent amendments brought about an explosion 
of new training programs, each designed for a particular seg 
ment of the poverty population. Following are the major 
categories of people and the programs designed to help them 
gain skills and jobs:
  Welfare Recipients: One of the nation's most vexing 
problems of the sixties was the growing number of 
households dependent on Aid to Families with Depen 
dent Children (AFDC). In 1962, a two-year experiment 
called the Community Work and Training Program of 
fered work experience to AFDC recipients. This was ex 
panded in 1964 into the Work Experience Program 
(later renamed the Work Experience and Training Pro 
gram). This effort evolved in 1967 into the Work Incen 
tive Program (WIN), with the Department of Health 
and Human Services providing such support services as 
medical care and child day care, and the Department of 
Labor providing training and job placement for women 
receiving AFDC with children above age six.
  Youths: The Job Corps set up residential centers, often 
in rural areas, for young people from inner cities, pro 
viding them with remedial education and job skills 
training. The Neighborhood Youth Corps, which 
operated in the cities where youths lived, provided part- 
time work experience, remedial education, and limited 
job training for high school dropouts and potential 
dropouts.
  Rural Elderly: Operation Mainstream provided work 
experience and income maintenance for workers over 
fifty-five in rural areas, where job opportunities are par 
ticularly scarce.
  Disadvantaged Adults and Out-of-School Youths: The 
New Careers Program was begun in 1966 to train 
paraprofessionals in such public service fields as health,
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education, welfare, neighborhood redevelopment, and 
public safety. It was subsumed and expanded in 1970 by 
the Public Service Careers Program, which added an ef 
fort to facilitate placement and eliminate barriers to 
employment.
The federal government has also made efforts to involve 
private firms in programs to train the unemployed and create jobs for them. The Job Opportunities in the Business Sector (JOBS) program, started in 1967, was a joint effort of the 
public and private sectors to develop on-the-job training pro 
grams for the disadvantaged. Later, tax credits were offered 
to firms that hired people who were eligible for job training 
programs. Relatively few employers used this tax credit, 
however, and a General Accounting Office study found that 
about 70 percent of the workers for whom tax credits had 
been granted were already employed prior to the credit 
allowance. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 includ 
ed provisions to restrict credits to newly hired employees.
The Public Employment Program
Although the programs of the 1960s were numerous, they 
did not involve the federal government in providing subsidiz 
ed public service jobs. The idea of doing so was considered in 
1969 when recession put an end to the prosperity of the 
previous decade. Congress responded by passing a general 
public employment program in 1970, but President Nixon 
vetoed it. The following year, when the unemployment rate 
reached a peak of 6 percent (a high figure for the time), Con 
gress and the president reached agreement on another bill: 
the Emergency Employment Act of 1971, which authorized 
the Public Employment Program (PEP).
PEP was considered a pilot program, and was intended to 
last only two years. It was, however, a sizable effort to 
counter cyclical unemployment. Funding was $1 billion for 
fiscal year 1972 and $1.25 billion for 1973. At its peak in July 
1972, it provided employment for about 185,000 persons. 4
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In keeping with the Nixon administration's philosophy of 
"New Federalism" that is, increasing the role of state and 
local governments in the operation of social programs that 
had previously been operated primarily by the federal 
government PEP put responsibility for operations in the 
hands of state and local governments. Funds went to states 
and to municipalities or counties serving populations of 
75,000 or more. The bulk of the money was allocated to 
governments in areas with unemployment rates higher than 
4.5 percent; additional money was distributed to areas with 
rates of 6 percent or more.
The federal government imposed very few restrictions on 
the state and local governments receiving funds. They could 
hire anyone who had been out of work for a week or more 
(later changed to two weeks), or who was underemployed. 
Underemployment was defined as working less than full time 
involuntarily, or working full time at wages that provided 
less than a poverty-level income. Preference was to be given 
to Vietnam veterans, youths and older workers, migrants, 
workers who did not speak English, welfare recipients, 
disadvantaged persons, and displaced scientists and 
engineers. Such broad "targeting" amounts to none at all. 
With so few rules, the federal government in effect "put the 
money on the stump and ran," a characterization of many of 
the intergovernmental grant initiatives of this period. This 
approach followed the philosophy of the early New 
Federalism, and was close to the design of the general 
revenue sharing program, passed in 1972. The approach did, 
however, enable participating governments to hire subsidiz 
ed workers quickly, which was a primary goal of the pro 
gram.
State and local governments naturally tended to hire 
workers who fit easily into established workforce patterns. 
Large percentages of participants were white (64 percent), 
male (72 percent), and between the ages of 22 and 44 (64 per 
cent). Forty-three percent had gone to school through 
twelfth grade, and another 31 percent had education after
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high school. 5 PEP participants were better educated and less 
disadvantaged than participants in the more structurally 
oriented programs begun in the sixties, and fewer were 
minorities.
Although the act authorized training, little money was 
spent for this purpose; an estimated 94 percent of the money 
was spent on compensation of participants. 6 The state and 
local governments that directly received PEP funds could 
subcontract to other units of governments, but little of this 
was done. Although data were not collected on this point, 
probably no more than 10 percent of the positions were sub 
contracted, and those were mostly to independent school 
districts.
Start and Growth 
of Public Service Employment
PEP was an addition to the collection of training pro 
grams that preceded it, not a replacement. These older pro 
grams, which had various clienteles and different operating 
organizations, were criticized for being uncoordinated and 
sometimes duplicative. Partly in response to this concern and 
partly in response to the Nixon administration's continued 
support of the concept of New Federalism, Congress in 1973 
passed the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act 
(CETA).
As originally passed, CETA had three main components. 
First, Title I established a formula to distribute money for 
training programs to state and local governments, and gave 
these governments the power to determine what particular 
kinds of programs they would operate. The state or local 
governments that received the funds directly, called "prime 
sponsors," could choose which agencies public or non 
profit would run the training programs. Second, Title II 
established a relatively small public service employment pro 
gram that would operate in areas of "substantial unemploy 
ment," defined as unemployment of 6.5 percent or more.
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The initial appropriation for Title II was $370 million; an ad 
ditional $250 million was allocated to phase out PEP until 
July 1974, when Title II took over. Finally, Title III allowed 
for direct federal operation of some national training pro 
grams aimed at special groups, such as Indians, migrants, 
and youths, and Title IV continued the Job Corps.
Title II was primarily designed to combat structural 
unemployment; the need for a program to alleviate cyclical 
joblessness was not strongly felt in 1973, since the peak of 
unemployment associated with the recession of 1969-71 had 
passed two years earlier. Those eligible for jobs under Title 
II were those who had been unemployed for 30 days or more, 
or were underemployed.
No sooner had programs started operating under Title II 
in the summer of 1974, however, than the nation began to 
suffer another major recession, this one largely brought on 
by sharply rising energy costs associated with the Arab oil 
embargo. Unemployment rose rapidly, eventually reaching a 
peak of 8.7 percent in the spring of 1975. In December 1974, 
Congress reacted to the joblessness problem by passing the 
Emergency Jobs and Unemployment Assistance Act of 1974, 
which added Title VI to CETA. Title VI established a PSE 
program that was explicitly countercyclical. Funds were to 
be given to prime sponsors in all areas. To be eligible for a 
Title VI job, a person had to be unemployed for 30 days, or 
for 15 days if the local unemployment rate was more than 7 
percent. Originally authorized for just 18 months, Title VI 
began with an appropriation of $875 million.
Implementation of Title VI brought rapid growth to the 
PSE program. As of December 1974, about 56,000 people 
were enrolled in Title II. Grants under Title VI went out to 
prime sponsors starting in January 1975, and by the end of 
June 1975 enrollments stood at about 155,000 for Title II 
and 125,000 for Title VI. The total enrollment in public ser 
vice jobs programs (including participants in the PEP pro 
gram's final months) stood at 310,000 in May 1975. 7 Figure
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1-1 shows the changes in enrollment levels in the various pro 
grams and titles over the decade.
The rapid buildup of Title VI enrollments strongly af 
fected the nature of the PSE program in its early months, as 
well as perceptions of it in Congress. The emphasis during 
this period was on hiring participants quickly to combat the 
effects of the recession. As had happened earlier with PEP, 
state and local governments were quickest to hire par 
ticipants with good educational and work backgrounds. As a 
result, the first report on the characteristics of PSE par 
ticipants, based on a sample taken between January and 
March 1975, showed that large proportions were white (66 
percent), male (71 percent), of prime working age (63 percent 
between ages 22 and 44), well educated (76 percent had 12 
years of schooling or more), and not economically disadvan- 
taged (64 percent). 8
These figures made the initial group of PSE participants 
look quite similar to regular employees of state and local 
governments. This perception, in combination with a Labor 
Department paper from 1974 suggesting, in theory, that PSE 
might have the effect of displacing many locally paid 
workers with federally subsidized workers, 9 led many in 
Congress to conclude that such displacement was in fact hap 
pening on a large scale.
This conclusion led to the first of several major 
congressionally-mandated shifts in the design of the PSE 
program. Title VI was due to expire on June 30, 1976. 
Unemployment remained relatively high it averaged 7.7 
percent during 1976 so as that date drew closer there was 
considerable pressure for renewing the title. The Senate, 
however, refused to approve a new Title VI authorization 
until changes were made. A stopgap appropriation in April 
carried Title VI participants on the Title II payroll until new 
legislation could be worked out. On October 1, 1976, Con 
gress passed the Emergency Jobs Program Extension Act, 
providing new funds for Title VI, retroactive to June 30.
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Figure 1-1 
Enrollments in Titles II and VI
and Total PSE, by Quarter 
September 1971 to September 1981
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The new legislation made two major changes in Title VI:
1. It required that all newly-hired Title VI workers 
beyond the number needed to "sustain" state and 
local governments at their previous level of PSE 
workers be assigned to special projects that would last 
for no more than a year. In effect, the PSE program 
now consisted of two components: "sustainment" 
positions, funded under Title II and part of the Title 
VI appropriation, and "project" positions, funded 
with the rest of the Title VI appropriation.
2. The act also imposed new restrictions on eligibility. 
Half of the vacancies arising under the sustainment 
portion of all the new positions created under the pro 
ject portion were to be filled with people who had 
been unemployed for at least 15 out of the preceding 
20 weeks. The previous rule required no more than 30 
days of unemployment.
The idea behind the "projects" approach was to remove 
PSE employees from the regular operation of the state or 
local government. The one-year projects were supposed to 
consist of specific tasks that would not otherwise be per 
formed. The result, Congress hoped, would be to make 
displacement more difficult. The new eligibility rules were 
intended to target the program on the long term unemployed 
and on low-income people. (The rules also stated that during 
the previous three months, participants had to earn no more 
than 70 percent of the "lower living standard" set by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. However, people who met the 
unemployment criterion generally also met the income 
criterion.)
Although Title VI was supposed to be the countercyclical 
element of PSE, the 1976 amendments gave it eligibility rules 
more appropriate to a structural program aimed at the long 
term unemployed while leaving Title II, the original struc 
tural element, with rules more appropriate for a counter 
cyclical program. The net effect of the changes, however,
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was to shift the overall PSE program to a greater structural 
emphasis. Even though the amendments allowed prime 
sponsors to fill half of the sustainment vacancies with people 
who met the old eligibility rule, in practice most prime spon 
sors applied the new rule to all new participants. This prac 
tice allowed program operators to shift participants from 
one title to another if funding levels for the two titles chang 
ed substantially, as had happened in 1976 while Title VI was 
temporarily suspended.
The 1977 Buildup
In May 1977, shortly after President Carter took office, 
Congress passed his administration's economic stimulus pro 
gram designed to provide jobs in the midst of continuing 
economic stagnation. An additional $4 billion was pumped 
into PSE for 1977 and 1978, much of it going to Title VI pro 
jects. Enrollment in the two titles rose rapidly, from roughly 
300,000 in May 1977 to a peak of 755,000 in April 1978.
During this period, prime sponsors increased the number 
of PSE positions that were subcontracted to community- 
based organizations. The 1976 amendments to the act recom 
mended that a "substantial" portion of PSE funds be chan 
neled to such groups; the Department of Labor later defined 
"substantial" as one-third of the positions. 10 When the 
Brookings field evaluation team made its first observation in 
July 1977, it found that 10 percent of the sustainment posi 
tions and almost one-fourth of the project positions were 
subcontracted to nonprofit organizations. 11 By the time of 
the second observation in December 1977, when total enroll 
ment stood at 610,000, one-fourth of all participants were 
assigned to work in nonprofit organizations; the proportion 
for "sustainment" positions was 10 percent, and for the 
"project" portion 43 percent. 12
The 1978 Amendments
In October 1978, Congress made further substantial 
changes to the PSE program when it passed new legislation
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reauthorizing CETA. Eligibility rules were again tightened, 
requiring applicants to have been unemployed for 15 weeks 
in the case of Title II or 10 weeks for Title VI (see table 1-1). 
Limits were tightened on the amount PSE workers could be 
paid, and new limits were imposed on the length of time any 
worker could remain in the program. These changes were 
designed to focus the program on the long term unemployed 
and to further limit prime sponsors' ability to displace 
regular workers with PSE workers.
Just as important, Congress required prime sponsors to set 
aside a certain percentage of funds to provide formal train 
ing for PSE participants. Helping state and local govern 
ments provide services was no longer one of the objectives of 
PSE. This goal, in fact, was no longer mentioned in the law. 
Instead, the primary focus was now on training the 
unemployed who had low levels of skills.
As it turned out, 1978 was the beginning of the end for 
PSE. The shift in goals mandated by the congressional 
amendments made local governments less enthusiastic about 
participating in the program, as chapter 2 will explain. Talk 
in the Carter administration of converting PSE into a 
welfare reform program cast further doubt on the ability of 
local officials to meet service goals through PSE; proposed 
was a "Better Jobs and Income Program" that would have 
provided minimum-wage public service jobs to heads of 
households receiving public assistance, and would have been 
administered through prime sponsors by the federal govern 
ment.
Enrollments in PSE dropped by 150,000 between 
September 1978 and August 1979. When the limits on the 
amount of time a person could stay in the program began to 
have an effect in September 1979, program operators began 
to terminate participants and not replace them. This brought 
enrollments down by another 150,000. Funding for PSE 
dropped from $4.1 billion in fiscal year 1979 to $3.2 billion 
in fiscal year 1980.
Table 1-1 
Summary of Legislative Changes in Public Service Employment
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Training
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Unemployed for 30 days (15 days in areas of 
substantial unemployment) or be 
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Maximum of $10,000 annually with a national 
average of $7,800 per participant.
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The end of PSE came in 1981, when the Reagan ad 
ministration took office. Citing continuing charges of fraud 
and abuse by local governments, the high cost per partici 
pant, and low rates of placement in unsubsidized jobs as 
reported by prime sponsors, the administration persuaded 
Congress to rescind the program's spending authority for 
fiscal year 1981 and to eliminate any authorization for fiscal 
year 1982. As a result, PSE ended on September 30, 1981.
The primary vehicle for job training became the Job 
Training Partnership Act (JTPA), which replaced CETA as 
of October 1, 1983. Unlike CETA, JTPA does not channel 
federal money directly to local governments; instead, funds 
go to each state governor, for allocation within the state. 
Also, JTPA puts a much heavier emphasis than CETA did 
on cooperation with the private sector. (The principal 
mechanism for such interaction under CETA had been Title 
VII.) At the local level, each area's JTPA program is run 
under an agreement between local government and a Private 
Industry Council (PIC), which includes a majority of 
representatives from private business. JTPA programs focus 
on training; they can include little work experience or pay 
ment of stipends to participants. JTPA explicitly prohibits 
public service employment. Finally, JTPA contains a com 
ponent to retrain dislocated workers—that is, experienced 
workers who have lost jobs in declining industries or whose 
skills have become obsolete because of technological ad 
vances. This final aspect of JTPA is quite similar to the em 
phasis in the Manpower Development and Training Act of 
1962, where large-scale federal training efforts had their start 
in the postwar era.
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Appendix to Chapter 1 
Summary of Legislative Provisions
The Emergency Employment Act (PEP)
Purpose
The act's stated goal was "to provide unemployed and 
underemployed persons with transitional employment in 
jobs providing needed public services during times of high 
unemployment and, wherever feasible, related training and 
manpower services to enable such persons to move into 
employment or training not supported under this act." 13
The legislation suggested "transitional" employment dur 
ing periods of high unemployment that was to lead to unsub- 
sidized jobs. In fact, there was no limit on tenure in the pro 
gram, and during the life of the program the unemployment 
rate never went below the trigger, thus providing continuous 
funding to the program agents.
The program also emphasized "needed public services" 
and allowed the program agents to indicate in their plans 
what these needed public services were.
Eligibility
Eligibility was limited to the "unemployed and 
underemployed." Unemployed meant those who were look 
ing for work. This also came to mean those who had been 
out of the labor force or who were new entrants. 
Underemployed was defined as working part time involun 
tarily or earning below poverty-level wages. As the program 
was implemented, this included persons working at wages 
that put them above the poverty line, but in jobs that were 
below those for which they were qualified.
The legislation also provided for equitable service to 
"significant segments of the population." 14 The significant 
segments included disabled Vietnam veterans and special
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veterans; young people (ages 18 to 22) entering the labor 
force; older persons (45 years of age and older); migrant and 
seasonal farm workers; those with limited English-speaking 
ability; people unemployed because of technological change 
or cutbacks in federal expenditure (particularly defense, 
aerospace, or construction); minority group members; ex- 
offenders; and the physically or mentally handicapped. 
Excluded from participation were employed white males be 
tween the ages of 22 and 45 who were not veterans or in af 
fected industries. There was essentially no targeting in the 
program.
Wages
No restrictions were put on local supplementation of 
wages. There was, however, a limit on federal-funded annual 
wages of $10,000 per year.
Types of Jobs
Program regulations included guidelines for the types of 
jobs that participants could hold. These were defined by 
functional area—that is, the job was defined by the function 
of the agency rather than by the specific occupation. For ex 
ample, a janitor in a school was defined as fulfilling the 
function of education. The approved functional areas were 
law enforcement, education, public works, health, en 
vironmental quality, fire protection, parks and recreation, 
social services, and other. ("Other" turned out to be one of 
the largest categories.) In essence, the suggested types of jobs 
included all the functions of local and state government. 
Thus, there were essentially no limits on the types of jobs in 
to which participants could be placed.
Training
The legislation provided that up to 15 percent of the funds 
could be used for training and supportive services. However, 
the program guidelines reduced this amount and specified 
that it be used only when absolutely necessary.
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CETA Title II
Purpose
The legislative statement of purpose for the original Title 
II was the same as for PEP; it emphasized transitional 
employment and the provision of needed public services.
Eligibility
To be eligible for Title II, a person had to reside in an area 
of substantial unemployment and have been unemployed for 
30 days or be underemployed. Significant segments of the 
population that were to be given equitable treatment were 
the long term unemployed, Vietnam veterans, AFDC reci 
pients, and former employment and training program par 
ticipants.
Types of Jobs
Sponsors were to establish a goal of limiting participation 
in PSE to 12 months. Sponsors were required to pay wages 
comparable to unsubsidized workers in similar jobs. A max 
imum wage of $10,000 was continued, along with an average 
wage of $7,800. There was no limit on the extent to which 
local sponsors could supplement the PSE wage. There were 
also no restrictions on the types of jobs that Title II par 
ticipants could hold.
Training
No less than 90 percent of the funds were to be used for 
wages; the remaining funds were to be used for administra 
tion, training, and supportive services. Given the small 
percentage of funds involved, administration took 
precedence over training.
CETA Title VI
Purpose
Same as Title II.
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Eligibility
To be eligible, participants had to have been unemployed 
for at least 30 days or be underemployed. If they lived in an 
area of excess unemployment (having an unemployment rate 
of 7 percent for three consecutive months), they had to have 
been unemployed for 15 days. Special attention was to be 
given to persons who had been unemployed for 15 weeks or 
more, those who had exhausted their unemployment 
benefits, and those who were unemployed but not eligible for 
unemployment benefits. Also to receive special considera 
tion were welfare recipients, veterans, and former employ 
ment and training participants.
Types of Jobs
Employing agencies were required to pay wages com 
parable to prevailing rates for other jobs with the same 
employer. Wages were limited to a maximum of $10,000 per 
year, with a $7,800 national average. With regard to the 
types of jobs that could be held, individuals were to be 
employed in projects with a duration of 12 months or less, 
although there was no limit on the duration of tenure in the 
PSE jobs.
Training and Transition
Ninety percent of the funds were to be used for wages and 
benefits. The remaining 10 percent included administration, 
leaving little for training and support services. Sponsors were 
to place 50 percent of their participants, but this was only a 
goal and waivers were readily accepted.
Title VI Projects
Purpose
To sustain the PSE jobs under Titles II and VI that existed 
as of June 1976 and require that any jobs above that level be 
used in projects of short duration.
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Eligibility
Half of the vacancies in the existing "sustainment" Title 
VI and all additional participants had to meet the new 
eligibility requirements. People filling these vacancies had to 
(1) have a family income in the preceding three months that 
was at or below 70 percent of the BLS lower living standard, 
and (2) be unemployed for 15 weeks or have exhausted their 
unemployment benefits, or be in a family that was receiving 
AFDC benefits. This had the effect of requiring both a 
history of unemployment and low household income, 
though the income requirement was diluted somewhat by 
limiting it to three months prior to application, the same 
period as the unemployment requirement.
Types of Jobs
Participants were to be employed in projects of a one-time 
nature that had a duration of 12 months or less. In addition, 
a "substantial portion" of these jobs were to be in nonprofit 
organizations. 15
Training
Eighty-five percent of the funds were to be used for wages 
and benefits, the rest being used for administration. There 
was no rule that agents set aside any share of the funds for 
training or support services.
Title II-D
Purpose
With the reauthorization of CETA in October 1978, the 
purpose of Title II was amended to include training and 
related services to enable participants to move into unsub- 
sidized employment or training. Title II-D was now to be a 
structural program.
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Eligibility
Eligibility was tightened considerably to require that an in 
dividual be economically disadvantaged and unemployed for 
15 of the prior 20 weeks or be a member of a family that was 
receiving public assistance. "Economically disadvantaged" 
meant a family income less than or equal to 70 percent of the 
BLS lower living standard. Households with a governmen- 
tally supported foster child, a handicapped person, or a pa 
tient or outpatient of a prison, hospital, or community care 
facility could also be considered economically disadvantag 
ed. Preference was to be given to the long term unemployed, 
public assistance recipients, disabled and Vietnam-era 
veterans, persons with limited English-speaking ability, the 
handicapped, women, single parent, displaced homemakers, 
youth, older workers, and individuals with limited education 
(a fairly impressive list).
Types of Jobs
The jobs provided were to be entry level, combined with 
training and support services, and designed to enable par 
ticipants to move into unsubsidized employment. Project 
jobs were not required to be entry level. Tenure in the pro 
gram was limited to 18 months in any five-year period. 16 
Wages were limited to a maximum of $10,000 and an average 
of $7,200, both adjusted by an area wage index within the 
range of 110 percent of the poverty line to 120 percent of the 
maximum wage. No local supplementation of wage levels in 
Title II-D was allowed.
Training
Ten percent of the funds were to be used for training in 
fiscal year 1979, 15 percent in fiscal year 1980, and 20 per 
cent in fiscal year 1981.
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Post-1978 Title VI
Purpose
With the reauthorization of CETA in 1978, Congress tried 
to convert Title VI back to a strictly countercyclical pro 
gram. That title was now to provide "temporary employ 
ment during periods of high unemployment" and funding 
was to be geared to the level of national unemployment, pro 
viding jobs for 20 percent of the unemployed if the national 
unemployment rate was more than 4 percent. If the national 
unemployment rate was in excess of 7 percent, the program 
was to employ 25 percent of the unemployed in excess of 4 
percent of the labor force. Note that the provision of public 
services was no longer a stated purpose of Title VI.
Eligibility
To be eligible, participants had to have been unemployed 
for at least 10 of the preceding 12 weeks, be currently 
unemployed, and be from a family that had an income less 
than or equal to the BLS lower living standard or that was 
receiving public assistance. The same groups were given 
preference as under Title II-D.
Types of Jobs
Half of the jobs were to be entry-level public service jobs. 
The other half were to be in projects with a planned duration 
of 18 months or less. One-third of the funds was to be used 
to support jobs in the nonprofit sector. Wages were limited 
to $10,000. This maximum was adjusted by up to 20 percent, 
based on the wage index for the area. Average wages were to 
be $7,200, again adjusted for the wage index of the area. 
Local supplementation of wages was limited to 10 percent of 
the funds under Title VI or 20 percent of the maximum in the 
case of any individual participant.
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Training
Not less than 10 percent of the funds in fiscal year 1979 
and 5 percent or more of the funds in successive years was to 
be used for training. In addition, sponsors were to prepare 
employability development plans for participants and 
specify in their plans the rates of transition that they hoped 
to achieve.
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How PSE Looked 
at the Local Level
The public service employment titles of CETA were ex 
pressions of federal policy, but this policy was implemented 
by state and local governments. This arrangement was one of 
the most important facts about the public service job pro 
grams of the 1970s and a major element that determined 
their outcomes.
If the objectives of the federal government had coincided 
with those of the governments that operated the programs, 
no issue would have arisen. But in fact local and state 
governments put primary weight on one objective—using 
PSE workers to help provide services—while the federal 
government focused on the objectives of creating jobs to 
ease cyclical unemployment and of providing work ex 
perience and training to the unskilled. PEP in 1971-73 and 
PSE in its first three years emphasized job creation, while 
PSE after 1976—and especially after 1978—emphasized 
training, but both objectives were found to some degree 
throughout the history of these two programs. For such pro 
grams to work, some sort of bargaining had to take place 
that resulted in a balance more or less satisfactory to both 
the federal government and the local program operators.
The story that emerges from the field research conducted 
at Brookings and Princeton is that such a balance was possi 
ble while the federal government's primary emphasis was on 
job creation. The relative lack of restrictions on local pro 
gram operators allowed them to hire large numbers of people
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who needed little training to fill positions that provided 
valuable services. Once the federal emphasis shifted to train 
ing the unskilled, the balance became more difficult to main 
tain, and with the 1978 restrictions became nearly impos 
sible. Whatever success PSE had after 1978 in providing 
work experience and training to the unskilled—and we will 
see in chapters 3 and 4 that it was not insubstantial—such ac 
complishments were costly in terms of local goals of pro 
viding services.
This chapter examines the relationship among the three 
objectives for public service employment, and shows how 
some of the outcomes of the program shifted with changes in 
federal government emphasis. These outcomes include the 
characteristics of the participants, the kinds of jobs they 
held, and the types of services they helped to provide. We 
also present evidence that different types of localities 
responded to the program changes in somewhat different 
ways, especially when localities that were in relatively good 
fiscal condition are compared with those that were not.
Local Objectives and Job Creation
During the period that job creation was uppermost in the 
minds of Congress and the federal administration, displace 
ment was the most widely discussed issue related to local 
government use of public service employment funds. The 
fear held by many members of Congress, as noted in chapter 
1, was that many local governments would simply switch the 
source of funding for large numbers of government positions 
from locally raised taxes to the federal PSE subsidy. If this 
were to happen, the total number of jobs in local govern 
ment agencies would stay about the same—or, to put it 
another way, the "net employment effect" of the federal 
program would be minimal.
This fear was not entirely baseless. Many local govern 
ments were facing budget crises due to the economic
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downturns of 1969-70 and 1973-74 which made it difficult to 
continue providing services in the face of declining tax 
revenue. The situation was especially severe for many older 
large cities, where revenue problems were compounded by 
the departure of businesses to suburbs and to other regions 
of the country. Rather than raise local tax rates, such cities 
might have used PSE funds for fiscal relief.
As we will show in chapter 3, the amount of displacement 
found by the field associates was less than had been sug 
gested by some observers. Nevertheless, the field associates 
did confirm that displacement was higher in large, distressed 
cities than in jurisdictions with less severe fiscal problems. 
More importantly, however, many of those governments 
were found to have used PSE funds to maintain positions 
that would have been eliminated without PSE; when elimina 
tion seemed to have been the only alternative, the field 
associates considered this use of PSE funds to be "program 
maintenance," rather than displacement.
Fraud and Abuse
An issue related to displacement is that of fraud and 
abuse. The PSE program acquired a reputation for fraud 
and abuse in its execution based largely on the wide publicity 
the news media gave to reports of improper or illegal use of 
PSE funds by local governments or other employing agen 
cies.
The term "fraud and abuse" covers considerable territory 
with unclear boundaries. It can refer to plainly criminal ac 
tions such as bribe-taking, or to more subtle violations such 
as political favoritism in hiring actions and budget alloca 
tions. Because the popular perception of PSE is that corrup 
tion was endemic to the program, we considered it important 
to include in our third-round field report form an analysis of 
this topic. The associates were in no sense program auditors 
or investigators; they were asked only to note instances of
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fraud and abuse that had either been documented by official 
action such as an audit, or had been publicly alleged by 
newspapers, community organizations, civic groups, or ag 
grieved citizens. Such a survey does not provide a definitive 
picture, particularly because an allegation of abuse may 
itself turn out to be unfounded or politically motivated. Yet 
the survey has some use as a general indicator of the level of 
program abuses.
According to the associates' reports, three out of every 
five jurisdictions were "clean"; no instances of program 
misconduct had been documented or even alleged. About 
one-fifth (22 percent) of the jurisdictions were reported to 
have had isolated or minor abuses, such as misappropriation 
of a small amount of PSE funds by a single PSE official, or 
failure of an employing agency to carry out its contract.
Ten percent of the jurisdictions had been cited for pro 
gram abuses. The main problem was the use of PSE for 
political patronage. These jurisdictions were ordered by the 
Department of Labor to take corrective action. In three 
jurisdictions, allegations of misconduct were being in 
vestigated at the time of the round three observation. Final 
ly, there was one jurisdiction where multiple, recurring 
abuses formed a pattern of persistent maladministration. 
The associate for this jurisdiction cited such actions as ir 
regular purchasing and contracting procedures, use of PSE 
funds for ineligible purposes, poor monitoring, use of PSE 
participants in political campaigns, and appointment of PSE 
staff based on political rather than professional qualifica 
tions.
The picture is not as consistently good as one would like, 
nor as bad as one could infer from the popular press. PSE 
has hardly been a model of purity; there have been enough 
PSE "horror stories" to prompt at least one writer to call 
CETA a "four-letter word." 1 Such a characterization seems 
overdrawn, however, based on the incidence of abuses 
reported in the field research.
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Local Objectives and Skills Training
In 1976, Congress shifted the emphasis of PSE from 
creating jobs to meeting the needs of people with relatively 
few skills that were in demand in the job market.
A program such as PSE can benefit unskilled or low- 
skilled people in three ways. First, it can provide work ex 
perience—that is, training in the basic work skills and habits 
needed for any job, such as getting to work on time, plus the 
"credential" of successfully holding a job for an extended 
period. Second, PSE can provide on-the-job training in par 
ticular skills, such as typing or repairing trucks, that can lead 
to unsubsidized jobs later. Work experience alone does not 
provide this kind of specialized skills training. For on-the- 
job training to occur, however, two things must be true: the 
job must require some particular skills, and the participant 
must not possess that skill when he or she enters the pro 
gram. If a program "creams" applicants by choosing only 
those who already have job skills, no training takes place. 
Such creaming was, in fact, occurring in PEP and in the ear 
ly phases of PSE, as local government agencies sought to 
hire people who were already qualified. The 1976 restrictions 
on eligibility, then, were a way to expand the amount of on- 
the-job training that PSE was providing.
The third way a program such as PSE can benefit the un 
skilled is by providing formal training—that is, the kind of 
training usually conducted in a classroom, rather than on- 
the-job. Such training can either provide specific job-related 
skills or general skills, including such fundamental general 
skills as reading and mathematics. This type of training was 
not emphasized in PSE until the 1978 amendments, which re 
quired local governments to set aside certain percentages of 
PSE funds for formal training.
Whatever kind of training PSE was to provide, this goal 
was in conflict with the local objective of using PSE workers 
to produce additional public services. Training implies
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matching the job to the needs of the participant, while pro 
viding services requires matching the participant to the re 
quirements of the job. The Brookings-Princeton field 
associates found that the latter was the practice during the 
early years of PSE in about three-quarters of the jurisdic 
tions they observed. The shifts in emphasis required by the 
1976 and 1978 amendments therefore necessitated changes in 
the characteristics of PSE participants and in the types of 
jobs they were assigned.
Changes in Participant Characteristics
Eligibility rules were quite loose for PEP and for PSE un 
til 1976, a period that coincided with the heavy federal em 
phasis on job creation. Participants during this early period 
tended to be similar in many respects to most regular local 
government jobholders: predominantly male, white, and 
between the ages of 22 and 44. 2 Only three PEP participants 
out of eight were economically disadvantaged, and only one 
out of eight were receiving any form of public assistance at 
the time they enrolled. Characteristics of PSE participants 
during the first six months of 1975 were almost identical to 
those of PEP participants (see table 2-1).
Significant changes in participant characteristics became 
apparent in the first six months of 1977, when the tightened 
eligibility requirements for new Title VI enrollees had taken 
effect and the Carter administration's buildup of PSE 
enrollments was just beginning (column 3, table 2-1). Much 
larger percentages of new enrollees were economically disad 
vantaged, and twice as many as before had been receiving 
public assistance just before they joined the PSE program. 
These trends continued between October 1977 and 
September 1978 (fiscal year 1978). Sizable increases are 
found not only for the economically disadvantaged and 
welfare recipients, but also for those with less than a twelfth- 
grade education (columns 4 and 5). This movement to the 
more disadvantaged segment of the population was strongest
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in the projects portion of PSE (about half of new Title 
VI enrollees), but was also found in the sustainment portion 
(Title II enrollees and the rest of Title VI). As noted earlier, 
many program operators hired new participants for both 
portions of the program under the new rules for the project 
portion, so that PSE workers could be shifted between titles 
if needed.
The movement toward hiring the less advantaged ac 
celerated after the 1978 eligibility restrictions took effect. 
The proportion of participants who were economically 
disadvantaged rose to 83 percent for those who joined the 
program between January and June 1979, and to 88 percent 
for those who joined between October 1979 and September 
1980 (fiscal year 1980). Compared with figures for January- 
June 1977, the data for 1979 and 1980 also show larger pro 
portions of women, blacks, and persons who did not go past 
eleventh grade. The percentages for Vietnam-era veterans 
and other veterans went down, partly because enrollments of 
women were going up.
According to the Brookings-Princeton field associates, 
persons enrolled in Title II-D (the new designation for the 
structural segment of the PSE program) were even more like 
ly to be from disadvantaged portions of the population than 
were participants in Title VI, the countercyclical portion. As 
of December 1979, Title II-D figures were higher than Title 
VI for percentages of women (50 versus 45 percent), blacks 
(73 versus 67 percent), education of less than 12 years (29 
versus 22 percent), and economically disadvantaged (96 ver 
sus 82 percent). Both titles showed significant changes from 
the past, but the emphasis on the disadvantaged was even 
stronger in Title II-D.
Table 2-1 
Percent Distribution of New Enrollee Characteristics
Characteristic
Sex
Male .................
Age
Under 22 ..............
22-44 .................
Race
White ................
Black.................
Other. ................
Education (Grade)
0-8 ...................
9-11 ..................
12.. ..................
13+..................
Military
Vietnam ERA veteran . . .
Non- veteran ...........
PSEb 
PEPa Jan.-June 1975 
(1) (2)
72
28
22
64
14
64
22
14
48
228
43
31
27
14
50
70
30
23
61
16
65
24
12
10
14
42
34
19
12
70
PSEC 
Jan.-June 1977 
(3)
65
35
20
65
15
66
25
9
8
17
40
35
16
13
71
PSEd 
Oct. 1977-Sept. 1978 
Sustainment Project 
(4) (5)
62
38
23
64
13
65
23
12
8
15
41
36
16
10
74
62
38
23
65
12
58
33
9
11
26
50
14
12
19
77
PSEa
Jan.-June 1979 
(6)
54
Aft
25
64
11
56
34
10
8
18
42
32
11
10
79
PSEf 
Oct. 1979- 
Sept. 1980
(7)
55
45
25
64
12
51
36
12
9
23
42
26
8
10
81
O
*Q
C/3
W
r o
OPC
n O.
r oo
ro>
Economically
Receiving public
38
12
37
10
61
25
73
30
83h
62
83h
67
88h
40
a. U.S. D.O.L. report as of November 30, 1972. Westat, Inc., Longitudinal Evaluation of PEP and Validation of the PEP Data Bank: Final
Report (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor, April 1975), Table 4-1.
b. New enrollees in PSE CLMS Followup Report No. 3, Table 1.
c. New enrollees in PSE CLMS Report No. 8, Fiscal Year 1977, Table 17.
d. U.S. Department of Labor CLMS Report No. 10, Characteristics of Enrollees Who Entered Adult Oriented CETA Programs During Fiscal
Year 1978, Table 13.
e. Preliminary CLMS data, U.S. Department of Labor.
f. CLMS Report No. 14, Fiscal Year 1980, Table 8.
g. Grades 0-7 and grades 8-11.
h. Receiving cash welfare and/or below 70 percent of BLS lower living standard and/ or below OMB poverty level income.
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W
r o
O
CD
o
Oe.
r
36 How PSE Looked at the Local Level
Changes in Types of Jobs 
Held by Participants
The 1976 and 1978 amendments made it increasingly dif 
ficult for local governments to continue to "fit the worker to 
the job," as they did in PEP and early PSE. The shift toward 
more disadvantaged persons in these two sets of amend 
ments, plus the introduction of a heavy emphasis on training 
as part of the 1978 amendments, made it necessary for 
governments to "fit the job to the worker."
This section presents data on changes in three aspects of 
public service job assignments:
• the types of services federally subsidized workers pro 
vided;
• the proportion of workers who were assigned to work in 
agencies of the government that operated the local pro 
gram, compared with the proportion who were assigned 
to nonprofit community-based organizations or to 
agencies of governments other than the program 
operator; and
• the type of occupations workers held, such as clerical or 
paraprofessional.
Data are available on types of services provided by PEP 
workers, allowing us to make comparisons with data on PSE 
gathered in 1977,1979, and 1980 by the Brookings-Princeton 
field associates. For the other two aspects of job assign 
ments, however, we are able to make comparisons only be 
tween 1977 and later years, as no comparable information 
was gathered on PEP or the earlier years of PSE.
Types of Services
The general type of services provided by the largest pro 
portions of public service job holders was "primary" ser 
vices—that is, the kinds of services that all local governments 
provide and that are considered basic. Public service job
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holders were found, for example, in nonuniformed positions 
in police and fire departments (shown as "protective ser 
vices" in table 2-2); in public works departments; in sanita 
tion and related departments (shown as "environmental 
quality"); and in general administrative services such as per 
sonnel or payroll offices. (Note that the data for PEP do not 
include a general administration category; many of the 
workers shown in the miscellaneous category were probably 
employed in general administration jobs.) Smaller but still 
significant numbers of workers were assigned to governmen 
tal or nonprofit agencies providing social services; to parks 
and recreation agencies; and to school systems (shown as 
"education").
The following excerpts from the reports of associates in 
dicate the variety of services that were provided.
In the early days of PSE the positions were deployed to 
stabilize primary services (i.e., public works, parks, real 
property) but the new project money is being used for 
more social services. Child care, drug treatment, and 
elderly care are representative of this branching out into 
variable services.
Some educational services would be cut back without 
PSE. In the school district we find teachers' aides and 
clerical workers in PSE slots. At the community college, 
PSE participants run special programs in drama, music, 
and vocational training. At the university, many PSE 
participants are research aides or clerical workers.
Brush clearing, park and recreation area improvement, 
record keeping, library services, and social services re 
quiring extensive client contact have all been visibly im 
proved by local PSE employment.
Two PSE projects have served as successful pilots which 
may lead to regional programs. One is a cancer screen 
ing and education program. Eleven other municipalities 
have shown an interest in sharing in this project. Some 
qualified personnel have been trained through this pro 
ject.
Table 2-2 
Types of Services Provided by PSE Enrollees
ffi
O
*0 
Cfl 
tfl
ro
O
g*
r o
Characteristic
pEpa
1971-72
December 1977b
Sustainment Project
December 1979b
II-D VI
Primary services............ 41
Protective ............... 17
Public works............. 19
Environmental quality..... 5
General administration .... (3)
Social services.............. 15
Social services............ 7
Health .................. 8
Cultural................. N.A.
Parks and recreation ........ 9
Education ................. 19
Miscellaneous.............. 12
Total ................... 100
58
19
11
16
12
19
10
6
3
17
6
1
100
45
1
16
19
9
25
16
7
2
15
6
8
100
25
6
9
3
7
35
24
7
4
34
1
100
42
11
19
5
7
33
21
7
5
8
14
3
100
a. Westat, Inc. Longitudinal Evaluation of the Public Employment Program and Validation of the PEP Data Bank, Final Report, U.S. Depart 
ment of Labor, Office of Program Evaluation, Employment and Training Administration, Washington, DC, April 1975, Table 5.2. 
b. Field evaluation data.
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PSE has been a stimulus for the creation of many non 
profit organizations in the county which now provide 
residents with a migrant health center, homemaker ser 
vice, crisis intervention centers, and numerous other 
cultural and social service programs.
In considering the figures in table 2-3, it is useful to recall 
what restrictions were in effect at the periods shown on who 
could be hired for public service jobs. For PEP, restrictions 
were practically nonexistent; for the sustainment portion of 
PSE in 1977, some restrictions were in effect, but these were 
less stringent than those applying to the projects portion. As 
of 1979, hiring under Title II-D was more tightly restricted to 
the disadvantaged than under Title VI.
The effects of these restrictions are clear in some 
categories. In protective services, little difference can be seen 
between the percentage of workers assigned under PEP and 
those assigned in 1977 to the sustainment portion of PSE, 
but hardly any project workers were found in this category. 
By 1979, the proportions of both Title II-D and Title VI 
workers in this category were considerably smaller than the 
proportion under PEP, but the figure under the less restric 
tive Title VI was somewhat larger than under Title II-D. 
These shifts suggest that police and fire department officials 
did not consider the more disadvantaged workers hired 
under stringent eligibility rules to be as valuable as those 
hired under rules that allowed more qualified persons.
Aside from the protective services category, governments 
in 1977 employed substantial portions of PSE workers in the 
primary service areas of public works and environmental 
quality. The more disadvantaged participants in project 
positions were especially likely to be used in these areas, 
often as laborers on street repair and garbage disposal crews. 
This suggests that, despite the hiring restrictions in place as 
of 1977, local governments were able to use PSE workers for 
needed basic services.
Table 2-3
Percentage Distribution of PSE Participants by Title and Employing Agency 
December 1977,1979 and 1980
Title
Sample 
governments
Other local 
governments
School 
districts
Federal and
state 
agencies
Nonprofit 
organizations
ffii 
*$
CO
W
ro o?ra
roo
II and IV - sustainment...... 65
VI - project................ 35
Overall average........... 52
II-D ...................... 34
VI........................ 55
Overall average........... 44
II-D ...................... 33
VI........................ 47
Overall average...........____39
SOURCE: Field study.
December 1977
6
6
6
December 1979
11
4
7
December 1980
11
2
8
14
12
13
22
6
15
22
7
16
10
43
25
31
31
31
31
39
34
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A countervailing trend had begun in 1977, however, and 
had gained strength by 1979. This was the increased tendency 
to assign PSE workers to nonprofit community-based 
organizations and to agencies of governments other than the 
prime sponsor. This trend will be discussed in the next sec 
tion, but signs of it can be seen in table 2-3. One such sign is 
increases in percentages of workers performing social ser 
vices, many of whom worked for nonprofit agencies. This 
category was espcially large in 1979. A second such sign is 
the sharp increase between 1977 and 1979 in the proportion 
of PSE workers assigned to school systems. By 1979, PSE 
workers were much less likely than before to be providing 
basic services for government agencies, and more likely to be 
providing social or educational services for agencies outside 
the local general-purpose government.
Use of PSE Workers by Nonprofit Agencies
Table 2-3 clearly shows the movement toward use of non 
profit organizations and agencies connected to governments 
outside the prime sponsor. In PEP, an estimated 10 percent 
of the workers had such assignments, most of them in school 
districts. In PSE as of December 1977, an overall average of 
48 percent were working outside the local prime sponsor's 
own departments, a figure that increased to 56 percent in 
1979 and 61 percent in 1980.
The use of workers in nonprofit organizations and agen 
cies of outside governments was especially common in the 
portion of PSE that was more restricted to disadvantaged 
persons. In 1977, this was the projects portion; in the later 
years, it was Title II-D. In 1979 and 1980, the local govern 
ments in the Brookings-Princeton sample were retaining only 
about one-third of Title II-D workers for their own agencies. 
The percentage of Title VI workers retained by these govern 
ments was also falling, however, and this drop in Title VI ac 
counts for the decline in overall retention figures between 
1979 and 1980.
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The decrease in the proportion of Title VI workers retain 
ed by local governments is all the more notable because the 
absolute number of Title VI workers was falling during this 
period in the jurisdictions covered by the Brookings- 
Princeton sample. Between 1979 and 1980, the total number 
of PSE workers in the sample dropped from 35,757 to 
31,417, and the percentage accounted for by Title VI 
workers fell from 49 percent to 37 percent.
There was one conspicuous exception to this pattern. The 
large distressed cities in the sample adapted to the decline in 
the overall number of PSE positions by pulling back Title VI 
slots from nonprofit agencies and from agencies of outside 
governments (see table 2-4). As of December 1980, these 
distressed cities retained 80 percent of the Title VI positions 
for their own agencies and allocated only 12 percent to non 
profit organizations. By contrast, the pattern was almost 
reversed in cities that faced less fiscal pressure. These 
governments retained only 12 percent of their Title VI posi 
tions and subcontracted almost three-quarters to nonprofit 
organizations.
As the PSE program shrank nationwide, the distressed 
cities were trying to maintain services by pulling PSE posi 
tions back into their own agencies, or at least by cutting the 
number of slots in their own agencies less sharply than in 
other agencies. Less distressed cities and suburban and rural 
governments, by contrast, saw less value in the more 
restricted PSE and reduced the proportions of workers 
assigned to their own agencies.
Occupations and Wages
After the 1978 amendments took effect, local governments 
assigned PSE participants to lower-level jobs and paid lower 
average wages than before (see table 2-5). The percentage of 
workers in professional, technical, or managerial positions 
as of 1979 was about half of what it had been in 1977 and in
Table 2-4
Percentage Distribution of PSE Participants by Employing Agency and Title
December 1980
Type of jurisdiction 
and CETA title
Sample Other local School 
governments governments districts
Federal and
state 
agencies
Nonprofit 
organizations Total
Distressed large cities 
II-D .................... 35
VI...................... 80
Total ................. 54
Other large cities 
II-D .................... 34
VI...................... 12
Total ................. 26
Smaller cities
and suburban areas 
II-D .................... 25
VI...................... 22
Total ................. 24
Rural areas 
II-D .................... 28
VI...................... 34
Total ................. 30
19
1
13
12
10
11
24
22
23
24
8
17
23
6
17
13
10
12
10
11
10
1
17
10
15
16
11
14
39
12
27
24
74
40
34
48
38
23
22
22
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
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NOTE: Figures do not always add to 100 because of founding. 
*Less than 0.5 percent.
Table 2-5
"s^ » '
December 1977b
PEPa
Occupation
Prof., tech., mgr. . 
Clerical ..........
Craft ............
Operative ........
Laborer. .........
Service ..........
\^ j c f*p1 1 Q n prti i c
Total ........
Percent
. 26 
18
2
1
24
. . 22
7
. . 100
Wage
$3.34 
2.76 
2.98 
2.98 
2.57 
2.72 
2.81 
2.87
Sustainment
Percent
28 
24 
3 
6 
28 
12
100
Wage
$4.61 
3.70 
4.85 
4.46 
3.99 
4.18
4.50
Project
Percent
27 
16 
4 
3 
36 
13
100
Wage
$4.39 
3.74 
4.33 
4.13 
3.98 
3.77
4.24
December 1979b
II-D
Percent
14 
29 
2 
2 
20 
33
100
Wage
$4.32 
4.05 
5.01 
5.71 
4.84 
4.35
4.32
VI
Percent
13 
24 
3 
3 
26 
30
100
Wage
$4.71 
4.24 
6.23 
6.36 
5.56 
5.04
5.10
December 1980b
II-D
Percent
15 
28 
2 
5 
26 
20 
5 
100
Wage
$3.88 
3.79 
3.62 
4.02 
3.87 
3.93 
3.85 
3.85
VI
Percent
26 
21 
6 
2 
24 
19 
1 
100
Wage
$4.29 
3.85 
3.90 
4.35 
4.08 
3.78 
3.23C 
4.02
How PSELo kedat thcalev
NOTE: Percentages may not add to 100 because of rounding.
a. Sar A. Levitan and Robert Taggart, eds., Emergency Employment Act: The PEP Generation (Salt Lake City: Olympus, 1974), Table (1-6,
1-2).
b. Field evaluation data.
c. Miscellaneous category for 1980 is composed of individuals who were full-time training and had only nominal jobs at the training site. 1980
figures are based on a stratified (by type of agency) random sample of 1,940 participants.
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the PEP program, while the 1979 percentage for clerical 
workers was considerably higher than those for previous 
years. The proportion of positions classified as service jobs 
also increased between 1977 and 1979, although, as we saw 
earlier, the types of services provided were less likely to be 
protective services and more likely to be social services, such 
as day care.
The reasons for these shifts were clearly related to the 
changes in eligibility rules. The field associate in a distressed 
large city where half the new PSE participants had less than 
12 years of education stated the following:
Officials report that there is a difference in the 
characteristics of new PSE jobholders. The new 
group is less educated, averaging a fifth-grade 
education level. Many of the new PSE jobholders 
cannot read, necessitating an increased need to 
redefine PSE jobs as laborer, trainee, and helper 
positions.
As the PSE program began to shrink in size, the nature of 
the jobs underwent further changes. Between 1979 and 1980 
the proportion of service jobs dropped sharply while in 
creases occurred in labor and paraprofessional occupations. 
Taken together, clerical, labor, and service occupations ac 
counted for about three-quarters of all Title II-D positions, 
and about two-thirds of all Title VI positions. In 1980, about 
5 percent of Title II-D jobs and 1 percent of Title VI jobs 
were classified as "student," suggesting that some of those 
in training programs had no other job assignments.
Just as striking as the shift in occupations was the drop in 
average wage levels after 1978. Until that year, the law im 
posed a limit of $10,000 on the amount of federally subsidiz 
ed wages any participant could be paid, but allowed local 
governments to supplement PSE workers' wages. The 1978 
amendments ended governments' power to supplement 
wages, keeping the maximum at $10,000 though govern 
ments in high-wage areas were allowed to go up to $12,000.
46 How PSE Looked at the Local Level
The limitation on maximum wages had always been a ma 
jor restriction on the kinds of jobs PSE workers could be 
assigned, because regulations also required local govern 
ments to pay PSE workers the same wages as regular 
employees at similar jobs. In many areas, regular municipal 
employees in many skilled occupations earned more than the 
PSE maximum. This meant that the restrictions on wages 
amounted to a restriction on the level of jobs PSE workers 
could hold and thus the types of services they could provide. 
From the federal perspective, these limits were necessary to 
prevent local governments from hiring skilled workers for 
PSE jobs, to direct positions to the disadvantaged, and to 
prevent inflationary pressure on wages in skilled occupa 
tions. The limits were also supported by unions of public 
employees, who feared that local governments might try to 
replace regular workers with subsidized PSE workers.
One way local governments stayed within the wage limits 
while technically complying with the rules requiring pay 
comparable to regular employees was to devise new person 
nel categories for PSE workers. As noted by the field 
associate quoted above, governments sometimes classified 
low-skilled, low-wage PSE workers as "aides," "trainees," 
or "helpers."
As the skill level of PSE enrollees declined, the use of such 
trainee positions increased and wages fell. Between 1979 and 
1980, average wages fell by about 20 percent in Title VI and 
by more than 10 percent in Title II-D. Wages of Title VI par 
ticipants in most occupations were higher than those for 
Title II-D workers in both years, but the gap was narrower in 
1980.
At the time of the December 1980 field observation, 
average wages in Title VI in the sample governments were 
only 27 percent above the then-current minimum wage of 
$3.25 per hour, and those in Title II-D were only 19 percent 
above it. These data provide evidence that many local 
governments in 1979 were "segmenting" their PSE 
workers—that is, assigning the better qualified workers to
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Title VI at higher wages than those earned by Title II-D 
workers in similar occupations. Evidence of this practice was 
less strong in 1980, though associates reported that it was 
still common in large distressed cities.
Summary
Public service job programs of the 1970s went through 
three stages. During the first stage, under PEP and the first 
three years of PSE, rules on eligibility were loose and local 
governments were able to hire just about anyone. This allow 
ed the government agencies to readily meet their goals of 
providing services with the help of PSE workers. In the sec 
ond stage, which began with the 1976 amendments, federal 
rules shifted to a greater emphasis on the disadvantaged, but 
local governments by and large were still able to meet their 
service provision objectives. During this period, the policy 
bargain we referred to at the beginning of this chapter was at 
work.
The third stage began with passage of the 1978 amend 
ments imposing stringent limitations on the types of workers 
that local governments could hire under PSE. The size of the 
program was shrinking at the same time. With these changes, 
all except the most fiscally distressed localities reduced their 
use of PSE workers for basic services in government agen 
cies. Large proportions of PSE workers were assigned to 
low-wage, low-skill occupations, many of them in nonprofit 
agencies. Provision of local government services was no 
longer one of the goals stated in the law; the policy bargain 
that had promoted local government cooperation was no 
longer in effect.
When the Reagan administration announced its intention 
to end PSE in 1981, many nonprofit agencies providing 
social services protested that they would have to severely cut 
back their operations without PSE workers. Local govern 
ment officials, however, watched the end of PSE in relative 
silence; for them, its usefulness in helping provide public ser 
vices was already past.
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The Job Creation 
Impact of PSE
A primary measure of success for an employment and 
training program such as PSE is whether it creates more jobs 
than would have existed otherwise. PSE's success at job 
creation was always one of the major questions about the 
program, for reasons discussed in the previous chapter. 
Local government concerns with balancing budgets, pro 
viding adequate services, and limiting pressure on local tax 
capacities make for powerful incentives to take an outside 
resource such as PSE and direct it to these ends rather than 
to creating new jobs for the unemployed disadvantaged, as 
intended by the federal government.
Concern about conflicts in goals between the federal 
government and local governments influenced both the 
design and evaluation of the PSE program. Speculation con 
cerning PSE and PEP suggested high rates of fiscal substitu 
tion and job displacement, and significant changes were 
made in the program's design, restricting local control over 
the program. The legislation under which these changes were 
enacted called for an evaluation of the job creation impact 
on PSE, and it was for this purpose that the public service 
employment field study was undertaken at the Brookings In 
stitution and later at Princeton University. The results of 
that evaluation as they relate specifically to the job creation 
question are the subject of this chapter.
The chapter begins with a discussion of the concept of job 
creation and how it was operationalized in the Brookings-
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Princeton field research. A detailed reporting of the results 
from four rounds of field observation is then presented. 
These observations span the period from July 1977 through 
December 1980, the period in which major revisions to the 
program's design were implemented, and encompass some 
forty jurisdictions.
The results of the field analysis indicate a consistently high 
rate of job creation, with between 80 and 90 cents of each 
PSE dollar contributing directly to job creation. As a further 
test of these findings, a statistical analysis was performed for 
a group of 30 large cities. The results of this analysis, based 
on annual financial data compiled by the U.S. Bureau of 
Census, are reported in an appendix to the chapter.
Defining and Measuring Job Creation
To assess the fiscal effects of any grant program, one must 
first reckon with the question of how these effects might 
manifest themselves. Simple notions of additivity and 
substitution described in grants theory take on subtle mean 
ings within the actual fiscal environments of recipient 
governments.
In the case of PSE, the fundamental distinction is between 
job creation and job displacement. Did PSE have a direct ef 
fect in stimulating a higher level of employment than would 
otherwise have occurred and in what specific ways did such 
job creation manifest itself? There is the fairly straightfor 
ward pattern where local employment increases at a faster- 
than-normal rate. Yet, there are more subtle patterns where, 
in the absence of PSE, layoffs would have occurred due, 
perhaps, to weakening fiscal circumstances among recipient 
governments. Simple comparisons of pre- and post-PSE 
employment patterns are likely to miss such job creation ef 
fects.
Under job displacement, PSE-funded positions are 
substituted for those that would otherwise have been financ-
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ed out of local revenue. This could arise as an accounting 
transaction, switching part of the current workforce on to a 
PSE-funded payroll, or as a more subtle pattern involving 
the addition of new, PSE-funded positions that were 
scheduled to be filled and financed out of local revenue. 
Underlying such displacement is the issue of fiscal substitu 
tion, a phenomenon inherent in all federal grant programs. 
It is through fiscal substitution that PSE is effectively 
transformed into a general revenue sharing program. Recip 
ient governments are, as a result, less constrained in the use 
of PSE and the job creation impact is weakened.
The strength of any research design must ultimately be 
judged by how sensitive it is to the ways in which direct job 
creation manifests itself in local employment patterns, as 
well as to job displacement impacts arising from fiscal 
substitution uses of PSE.
Alternative Research Designs
Some researchers have attempted to gauge the effects of 
PSE according to the estimated impact of such assistance on 
total spending. 1 To the extent that PSE positions are subcon 
tracted to nongovernmental agencies, such studies 
understate the total spending effect of PSE. Moreover, 
macro-level analyses of gross spending effects bring little or 
no refinement to bear on the nature of job creation and 
displacement impacts, nor do they provide any insight into 
variations in spending and employment effects across dif 
ferent segments of the state and local government sector.
Other researchers have used regression estimates of the 
total number of state and local jobs to see whether this total 
increased by an amount equal to the number of PSE posi 
tions. If the overall increase in state and local employment is 
less than the number of PSE jobs, they conclude that govern 
ments used federal funds for displacement. 2 By examining 
only aggregate state and local government employment, 
these researchers fail to account for the many PSE positions
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subcontracted to nonprofit organizations and the smaller 
number of slots subcontracted to federal agencies. This 
failure leads to an overestimate of displacement. At the same 
time, there is evidence that many governments used their 
own funds to add regular employees to administer the PSE 
program and supervise PSE workers. To the extent this oc 
curs, examination of aggregate employment may result in 
estimates of displacement that are too low.
A third group of researchers has tried to estimate the trend 
in local government employment and relate any deviation 
from this trend to the number of PSE positions. This ap 
proach tends to overestimate displacement for two reasons. 
First, like the two methods just mentioned, it fails to account 
for subcontracting to nongovernmental employing agencies. 
Second, it fails to consider the possibility that the rate of 
growth in local government employment has slowed because 
of citizen concern over mounting expenditures and property 
taxes. 3
The Brookings-Princeton Framework
The Brookings-Princeton field associates used the follow 
ing framework in determining whether a particular use of a 
PSE worker constituted job creation or displacement:
Job Creation
• New programs and services: Cases in which additional 
programs or services were provided with PSE funding 
that would not otherwise have been undertaken.
• Special projects: New, one-time projects lasting one 
year or less that were undertaken with PSE funds.
• Program expansion: Cases in which the level of services 
was raised or services were improved under existing pro 
grams by using PSE funds beyond what they would be 
with local funds.
• Program maintenance: Cases in which PSE employees 
were used to maintain existing services that would have
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been curtailed without PSE funding. This is considered 
job creation because total employment was higher than 
it otherwise would have been.
Job Displacement
• Transfers: Cases involving the transfer of existing state 
and local government positions to PSE funding.
• Rehires: Cases in which state or local employees were 
laid off and then rehired with PSE funding.
• Contract reduction: Cases in which PSE participants 
were used to provide services or to work on projects that 
had been, or normally would have been, contracted to 
an outside organization or private firm.
• Potential hires: Cases in which PSE participants were 
hired to fill positions that otherwise would have been 
funded with other revenue.
Using this framework, the job creation category captures 
instances where PSE funds were unaffected by fiscal 
substitution, resulting in the direct creation of jobs and a 
higher level of employment than would have existed in the 
absence of PSE. Under job displacement, on the other hand, 
the employment impact is confounded by fiscal substitution. 
In the case of "transfers," for example, PSE-funded 
workers displace previously employed workers, creating a 
possible effect on the composition of local employment, but 
undermining the program's direct impact on the level of 
employment, subsequent uses of freed-up local revenue not 
withstanding. 4 In the case of "rehires," fiscal substitution 
undermines the impact of PSE on both the level and com 
position of local employment patterns. From this categoriza 
tion, it follows that while displacement uses of PSE do not 
preclude compositional effects on local employment patterns 
or longer term effects on employment levels, the overall 
strength and timing of such effects are much more uncertain.
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Program Maintenance
The program maintenance category turned out to be of 
considerable importance in accounting for the job creation 
impact of PSE, particularly among larger, fiscally distressed 
cities. In effect, the associates determined that these cities 
would have cut certain services, but instead were able to keep 
them going with PSE funds.
Such uses are not considered to be displacement because 
the positions in question would not have been funded 
without the PSE program. The essential question is whether 
attitudes toward local public services had shifted in the mid- 
seventies enough to cause some jurisdictions to cut services 
or expand them more slowly at the time the PSE program 
was expanding. To the extent that the level of local govern 
ment employment departed in this way from its historic up 
ward trend, an econometric or simple trend study would 
overstate the displacement effects of PSE because it would 
overpredict aggregate state and local employment. 5
Other researchers have noted that growth in local public 
employment had begun to slow even before California voters 
passed Proposition 13 in 1977, a referendum that required 
state and local governments to roll back property tax rates 
and imposed restrictions on their ability to raise rates in the 
future. For example, George Peterson of the Urban Institute 
testified in July 1978: "For the quarter century ending in 
1975, local public spending rose year in and year out relative 
to national product, but, during the present economic 
recovery, city expenditures have grown at a much slower rate 
than national output. Cities suffering economic and popula 
tion declines have taken the lead in restraining 
expenditures." 6
A similar pattern was observed for the large cities in the 
study, actually beginning prior to 1975. The 16 cities are 
divided in table 3-1 into two groups—large distressed cities
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and other large cities. 7 The table shows the change in full- 
time-equivalent noneducational employment in the distress 
ed and other large cities as well as in cities as a whole. These 
figures from the U.S. Bureau of the Census include PSE 
workers retained by the city for positions in their own agen 
cies. Also shown in table 3-1 are the estimated population 
change from 1970 through 1976 and the number of PSE par 
ticipants in December 1977 as a percentage of the total 
number of city government employees in 1976.
Table 3-1
Selected Data on Employment Trends
in the Brookings-Princeton Sample Cities
________________1970-1976____________
PSE employees
Percentage change in the city 
in total government 
noneducational Percentage change December 1977 
employment in population as a percentage 
______City________1970-19768_____1970-1976b of 1976 employment6
Large distressed cities
Baltimore............. -13d -9 10
Boston ............... -4 -6 11
Cleveland............. -36 -17 14
Detroit ............... -23 -13 14
New Orleans........... + 8 -2 10
Philadelphia........... +8 -8 11
Rochester ............. -27 -11 11
St. Louis.............. 0 -17 13
Total............... -9 -10 12
Other large cities
Chicago .............. +10 -9 8
Houston.............. +51 +15 9
Kansas City ........... +15 -10 16
Los Angeles ........... +5 -2 9
Phoenix .............. +42 +14 16
San Francisco.......... +6 -7 12
St. Paul............... +19 -12 8
Tulsa................. +28 +1 11
Total............... +13 -2 10
All cities ................ + 12
a. From U.S. Census Bureau, City Employment, 1966-1976. Includes PSE positions, 
b. From Department of the Treasury, Office of Revenue Sharing, Initial State and Local 
Data Elements, Enrollment Period 10.
c. From Brookings field data. Excludes all subcontracted and outstationed positions, 
d. Data for 1976 include employment in municipally operated institutions of higher educa 
tion.
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For all cities combined, city noneducational employment 
increased by 12 percent in this period. Among the other large 
cities in the Brookings-Princeton sample (the second group 
in table 3-1), total employment increased by 13 percent, even 
though the population of these jurisdictions declined by 2 
percent. PSE employees amounted to roughly 10 percent of 
the workers in these city governments.
In sharp contrast, total city employment (including PSE 
employment) in the distressed large cities in the sample 
decreased by 9 percent between 1970 and 1976. The declines 
for Cleveland, Detroit, and Rochester were 36, 23, and 27 
percent, respectively. Since 1972, the peak year for employ 
ment in this group of cities, employment levels in all of them 
have declined.
As a group, distressed large cities were aided dispropor 
tionately under the PSE program. The distressed large cities 
in the sample accounted for 4 percent of all PSE enrollees as 
of December 1977, but only 1 percent of total state and local 
employment. This concentration of PSE positions in the 
governments that appear in other respects to be departing 
from the trend line of city employment adds to the difficulty 
of conducting econometric or trend-type studies of the pro 
gram's employment impact.
This finding of local employment cutbacks in some of the 
sample jurisdictions applied not only to large cities but to 
small ones as well. Following is a quote from the field 
research associate for a small city in the sample indicating 
much the same shift. The associate concludes that the onset 
of "a period of fiscal austerity" has hardened attitudes 
against the use of PSE positions for displacement purposes.
By 1976, the climate had changed dramatically. 
Most of the major projects the city council 
members wanted to achieve had been completed. 
Taxes had increased substantially and the city was
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beginning to experience its first real pressure from 
the suburbanization of business. The 1976 council 
election revolved around the issue of taxes. Conser 
vatives won two of the three seats up for election. 
The remaining three members had sensed the at 
titude of the voters before the 1976 election and the 
election outcome confirmed their interpretation. A 
period of fiscal austerity ensued, presided over by 
the same city manager who had been an expan 
sionist in earlier years. As the next election draws 
near, economic development and stable taxes are 
the main concerns of the elected officials. The city 
manager's policy toward PSE has been consistent 
with the council's stated intention of not raising 
taxes. Thus the political-administrative climate is 
against converting PSE positions to unsubsidized 
positions.
A field associate's appraisal of local fiscal conditions and 
prospects determined whether the associate considered a 
government's use of PSE workers to be program 
maintenance. If the associate determined on the basis of in 
terviews and financial and employment data that the fiscal 
pressure (real or perceived) on a jurisdiction was so severe as 
of the observation date that the jurisdiction would have cut 
existing service levels, then using PSE employees to maintain 
these services was classified as program maintenance and 
was not at that time regarded as displacement. Alternatively, 
if the associate determined that a jurisdiction had used PSE 
funds to maintain services that in his or her judgment would 
have been provided with other revenue, this was a case of 
displacement of the potential-hire variety.
Field Research Findings on Job Creation
Information bearing on the job creation impact of PSE 
was collected over four rounds of field observations. The
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first observation was made in July 1977, just after Congress 
had required half of Title VI participants to be employed in 
projects and had tightened eligibility requirements. Between 
the first observation and the second, in December 1977, the 
size of the program had doubled; as a result, many of the 
positions that were involved in the analysis of net employ 
ment effects were newly created. As part of the 1977 
buildup, prime sponsors (local governments designated as 
direct recipients of PSE grants) were also encouraged to 
place an increasing share of PSE workers with nonprofit 
agencies through subcontracting arrangements. From the 
second round to the third round of observations in 
December 1979, the total size of the program was reduced by 
nearly half, the eligibility requirements were significantly 
tightened, and Congress reduced the wages that could be 
paid as well as a local government's ability to supplement 
wages with local revenue. A tenure limit was also imposed on 
participants. The final round of field observations occurred 
in December 1980, by which time the earlier program amend 
ments governing wage rates and tenure had been fully im 
plemented.
Table 3-2 summarizes the information on job creation and 
displacement uses of PSE for each of the four rounds of field 
observations. 8 Looking over the field data, a consistent pat 
tern emerges indicating a very high proportion of PSE funds 
used for job creation. Most of the job creation activity is ac 
counted for through expansions of existing services and pro 
gram maintenance uses of PSE.
Although a more detailed breakout of the field data is 
necessary to understand the particular circumstances that 
shaped local responses to PSE, the very high rate and consis 
tent pattern of job creation is noteworthy, particularly in 
view of earlier studies reporting a much greater tendency 
toward displacement. As noted above, conventional grants 
theory points up the possibility of conflicting goals between 
grantor and grantee which, in the case of PSE, might limit
The Job Creation Impact of PSE 59
the program's job creation impact. However, the field 
research found that the tendency for local governments to 
use federal funds for fiscal relief was limited by three impor 
tant factors.
Table 3-2
Job Creation and Displacement Rates
for All PSE Positions Sampled in Each Round
of the Brookings-Princeton Field Study
Job creation .......
New services ......
Expansion of
existing services .
Special projects . . .
Program
maintenance ....
Job displacement ....
Transfers ........
Rehires ..........
Potential hires ....
Contract reduction
Other ............
July
1977
82
9
31
12
31
18
7
*
8
1
2
December 
1977
85
14
44
13
15
15
3
*
10
1
*
December December 
1979 1980
85 89
12
31 N.A.
7
35
14 11
N.A. N.A.
Total .............. 100 100 100 100
First, laws and regulations administered by the Depart 
ment of Labor prohibited the use of PSE grant funds for 
fiscal relief. In this respect, PSE differed from general 
revenue sharing.
Second, local officials considered the PSE program to be 
temporary and its future funding uncertain and, therefore, 
did not want to rely on PSE for fiscal relief, unless it was ab 
solutely necessary to do so. Because PSE was an operating 
grant rather than a capital grant, a local government that
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used these funds to provide ongoing services or continuing 
fiscal relief could have found itself forced to boost taxes if 
federal funding was discontinued or significantly reduced. 
Clearly the history of PSE and its predecessor raised doubts 
about the continuity of this federal funding.
Finally, local officials were in sympathy with the federal 
objectives; that is, they shared the federal objectives of 
reducing unemployment and providing additional jobs for 
the disadvantaged. The field associates found that, in some 
places, "generalist" local officials—such as the mayor and 
budget director, who were responsible for the entire 
city—were more likely to place a high value on uses of PSE 
for fiscal relief, while directors of employment and training 
offices or departments, who implemented PSE, were more 
likely to agree with the employment and training objectives 
of PSE. Even generalist officials by and large recognized the 
value of training and job creation, however.
Legal restrictions and attitudes toward uncertainty not 
withstanding, it might be argued that displacement uses of 
PSE would be expected to increase over time. But to make a 
general statement that displacement would increase over 
time, one must assume that the size and character of the pro 
gram would remain stable. In a stable program, displace 
ment might increase as jurisdictions adjusted each new year's 
budget to take account of PSE positions. In fact, however, 
the PSE program was anything but stable. Its size, regula 
tions, and level of funding all shifted almost constantly over 
the four rounds of field observations.
The doubling in the size of the program between the first 
and second rounds, together with the implementation of 
tighter eligibility criteria and restrictions on the types of jobs 
to which PSE participants could be assigned, would be ex 
pected to enhance the job creation impact of PSE. When 
Congress suddenly adds large amounts of money to a grant 
program, local governments cannot instantly substitute the 
added federal money for locally-raised revenue, because pro-
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gram and hiring decisions are made well in advance and can 
not usually be reversed at the drop of a bundle of federal 
dollars. Similarly, tighter restrictions on the types of persons 
eligible to be hired with the PSE funds and on the types of 
jobs to which they may be assigned make it more difficult to 
substitute PSE-funded workers for those who would other 
wise be funded out of local revenue sources.
Other forces that held displacement down included the 
provisions in the 1978 CETA amendments which extended 
tighter eligibility criteria to PSE workers funded under Title 
II-D. The 1978 amendments also restricted wage levels and 
supplementation of participant wages and thus the ability of 
governments to place workers in high-paying jobs, and 
limited a PSE worker's tenure in the subsidized job to 
eighteen months. These amendments made PSE workers less 
attractive for use in the kinds of jobs ordinarily filled by 
regular government employees, and so reduced the tempta 
tion to use PSE for displacement. Because of the new restric 
tions and the training requirements, many governments sub 
contracted larger proportions of their PSE workers to non 
profit organizations, which, as discussed later, were less like 
ly to use them for displacement.
The restriction on tenure forced many local governments 
to either fire many PSE workers or absorb them into regular 
permanent jobs when they reached the limit on October 1, 
1979, just three months before the third round of field obser 
vations. Presumably, a substantial number of those who 
might have been filling positions that constituted displace 
ment were out of the PSE program by the December 1979 
observation.
Without the change in the legislation, displacement would 
almost certainly have increased in the third round of field 
observations. Probably most important are the wage, sup 
plementation, and tenure limits. Because of the decline in the 
size of the program, local governments would have pulled
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back to those positions in the government that were con 
sidered most essential. However, as noted earlier, the tenure 
limit led to the absorption of large numbers of PSE workers 
into the regular payroll on October 1, 1979, and many of 
these absorbed positions had previously been identified as 
displacement. Further, despite the large reduction in the pro 
gram, the share of positions retained by the governments 
declined, due largely to the wage limits and the training re 
quirements in the new legislation.
Some of these points were illustrated by the reports of the 
associates. An associate in a suburban county reported:
Displacement is not as prevalent as it was in the 
first and second rounds. The major reason for this 
is that most of the agencies and local governments 
that were using the program for regular employ 
ment have dropped out of PSE. Many school 
districts and small local governments in the outly 
ing areas of the county have chosen not to continue 
their affiliation with PSE. The reasons cited were 
that:
1.The wages were so low that they cannot 
create jobs in protective services, utilities, 
and sanitation, areas where they could use 
more employment.
2. The changes in personnel requirements that 
would allow continued use of PSE are 
resisted by the existing regular workers.
3. The people who are eligible for the program 
are unsuited for the jobs the government can 
or would want to create.
As the impact of the 1978 amendments filtered through 
the program, a number of agencies absorbed their current 
PSE slots and made it clear that they were disappointed with
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the program. In brief, they stated that there was no longer 
anything in PSE for them. From the associate in a distressed 
large city:
The wage limits and the new eligibility rules have 
severely limited the ability of the local government 
to use CETA funds to hire more skilled employees 
in administrative and technical positions. Without 
these restrictions, the city would use more of the 
CETA money for higher paid employees who 
would perform normal city functions.
Variations in Net Employment Effects
Job creation and displacement rates varied in several 
ways—by type of employing agency, between the two titles 
of the act, from one type of jurisdiction to another, and 
among jurisdictions facing varying levels of fiscal pressure. 
The following sections analyze these variations.
By Type of Employing Agency
As part of the 1977 expansion of PSE, prime sponsors 
were encouraged to use nonprofit agencies in placing PSE 
workers. Such placements to nonprofit agencies, as well as to 
school districts, other local governments, and state and 
federal agencies, involved two kinds of arrangements: sub 
contracting and outstationing. Outstationing refers to 
employees who are paid by a prime sponsor government and 
carried as employees of that government, but in fact work 
for some other entity or agency. Generally, this was done as 
an administrative arrangement that allowed smaller 
organizations that did not have developed payroll systems to 
employ PSE employees, but have their wages paid by the 
prime sponsor government. In other cases, particularly in the 
smaller jurisdictions, it was done as a matter of ad 
ministrative convenience.
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Subcontracting was far more common than outstationing. 
Under the subcontracting arrangements, PSE participants 
were employees of the subcontracting agency, which was 
reimbursed on a contractual basis by the prime sponsor 
government.
An increasing share of PSE workers were employed 
through subcontracting arrangements (mainly with non 
profit organizations) over the period from December 1977 
through December 1980 (see table 2-3). In addition, there 
was a pronounced shift in the type of PSE-funded worker re 
tained by the sample governments operating as prime spon 
sors. While nearly two-thirds of the Title II and Title VI sus- 
tainment slots were retained by these governments as of 
December 1977, Title VI project slots became the preferred 
use of PSE workers in 1979 and 1980. This largely reflects 
rule changes governing eligibility, training, and local sup 
plementation of wages, the net effect of which made Title 
II-D assistance more restrictive.
Information on uses of PSE by type of employing agency 
is provided in table 3-3. These data are as of the third round 
of field observations. Except for some upward drift in pro 
gram maintenance over four rounds of field observations, 
the patterns of net employment effects reported as of 
December 1979 are consistent with those observed in the 
other rounds.
High rates of job creation noted earlier were found in each 
type of employing agency, ranging from a low of 80 percent 
for the sample governments to a high of 93 percent for non 
profit organizations. Among the job creation categories, 
program maintenance accounted for roughly half of the 
positions retained by the sample governments and of those 
subcontracted to school districts.
Table 3-3
Percentage Distribution of Employment Effects by Employing Agency
December 1979
Sample 
Effect governments
Job creation ...............
New programs 
and services ............
Expansion of 
existing programs .......
Special projects ..........
Program maintenance ..... 
Job displacement ...........
Total ...................
80 
6
21 
5 
48
20 
100
Other local 
governments
87 
1
70 
8 
8
13 
100
School 
districts
86 
8
22 
1 
54
14 
100
Federal and 
state 
agencies
90 
10
60 
15
5
10 
100
Nonprofit 
organizations
93 
26
39 
12 
16
7 
100
NOTE: Totals may not add due to founding.
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Commenting on such uses, the associate in a large, fiscally 
distressed city noted:
Almost all of the city's sample positions were 
classified as job creation due to the severe financial 
conditions of the city. Seventy-one percent of all 
city positions were classified as program 
maintenance—usually because the employment 
trend analysis indicated that PSE had enabled the 
city to maintain a "traditional" level of service. 
This was especially true in Title VI where almost 
everyone is program maintenance. These positions 
included waste collectors, municipal laborers, and 
major portions of the recreation department. Title 
II-D had more service expansion than Title VI. 
Most expansion was in low-skill jobs (municipal 
service laborers, junior clerks, and truck drivers) 
and usually occurred when many PSE workers were 
hired in one category—at least a portion of which 
were classified as program maintenance.
In local governmental agencies outside the prime sponsor 
governments and in state and federal agencies, most posi 
tions were used to expand existing programs. Schools used 
many PSE workers for program maintenance, but also ex 
panded programs by using PSE workers as teacher aides, 
hall monitors, and lunchroom workers or as counselors or 
medical screeners. Local government agencies outside the 
sample governments often used PSE workers as deputies in 
the sheriff's department, as librarian assistants, and in 
similar jobs that expanded the operations of the government 
beyond what would be funded out of local revenue.
In state and federal agencies, the expansion of existing 
programs meant more hours of service in an office, expan 
sion of social services to additional areas or more clients, 
more workers in the state parks, equipment that was better 
maintained, and the like.
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Nonprofit organizations were the only agencies providing 
significant levels of new services with PSE. Expansion of ex 
isting services and new programs accounted for virtually all 
of the job creation within nonprofit organizations. An exam 
ple from a large city:
Local services provided as a result of job creation 
outside City Hall included an artist-in-residence 
program reaching youth, aged, handicapped, and 
minority audiences; day care; clerical and bilingual 
assistance for area teachers; custodial and 
maintenance assistance for area schools and 
community-based organizations; and education, 
nutrition, recreation, and transportation services to 
the city's dependent populations (senior citizens, 
youth, minorities, handicapped, disadvantaged).
Displacement uses of PSE were primarily identified with 
the "potential hire" category, and were somewhat higher 
among the prime sponsor or program agent governments in 
the sample. Over time, displacement often occurred in ser 
vices that came to have lives of their own. For example, 
recreation programs and such social service programs as 
transportation for the elderly and "meals on wheels" 
developed constituents who would demand that they be sup 
ported out of other sources in the absence of PSE. In other 
cases of displacement, nonprofit organizations used PSE 
funds in place of privately raised revenue, salting away the 
savings toward the day when PSE was no longer available. 
Such uses were identified by an associate in a distressed large 
city:
Displacement in nonprofit organizations with Title 
II-D training projects is very low since many of the 
PSE participants do not provide essential services 
but rather are receiving training. Many nonprofit 
agencies are having their first experience with PSE 
employees and have not yet put them in critical job 
slots. However, some nonprofit agencies have hired
68 The Job Creation Impact of PSE
PSE participants to operate fork lifts, drive buses, 
and perform other tasks for which the employee 
can become essential. In these cases, the agencies 
have indicated that without PSE funding, they 
would probably be able to find other money to 
keep these employees on the job.
Variation by Title
As noted earlier, Title VI became the preferred title by the 
sample jurisdictions because of rule changes related to 
eligibility, training and local supplementation of wages. In 
the second round, the sample governments retained a higher 
proportion of Title II and Title VI sustainment positions 
than of the Title VI project positions, but by the third round 
they retained more Title VI positions and subcontracted 
more Title II-D positions.
Table 3-4 shows that this preference for Title VI was 
reflected in both the extent of displacement and in the degree 
of program maintenance. Displacement was somewhat
Table 3-4
Percentage Distribution of Net Employment Effects by Title 
December 1979
———————Effect——————————Title n_D Title VI
Job creation ......................
New programs and services ........
Expansion of existing services ......
Special projects ..................
Program maintenance ............
Job displacement ..................
Total ........................
87
17
37
4
29
13
100
84
8
25
9
42
16
100
higher and program maintenance accounted for a much 
greater share of job creation uses under Title VI, a pattern 
consistent with that observed earlier for the prime sponsor
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governments. Correspondingly, smaller proportions of Title 
VI participants were used to provide new programs and ser 
vices or to expand existing services than was the case with 
Title II-D participants. Again, this pattern is consistent with 
the uses made of the PSE program by the prime sponsor 
governments compared with the uses made by nonprofit 
organizations and other employing agencies.
Variation by Type of Sample Government
As might be expected, large cities facing severe fiscal 
distress were the most likely to use PSE workers to maintain 
programs that otherwise would have been cut back or 
eliminated (see table 3-5). Most of these cities have declining 
populations, declining tax bases, and fairly high demands 
for public services. About one-fifth of the PSE positions in 
these jurisdictions were judged to represent displacement, 
with PSE workers assigned to basic services that the 
associate judged would have had to be maintained out of 
local revenue in the absence of PSE funding.
In the other large cities that faced less fiscal distress, prime 
sponsor governments subcontracted substantial numbers of 
PSE workers to outside agencies. These cities had nearly 
twice the proportion of workers who were providing for ex 
pansions of existing service levels. However, a fairly high 
proportion (34 percent) of the positions in these jurisdictions 
were classified as program maintenance and only 10 percent 
were categorized as displacement.
Smaller cities and suburban areas had more than half of 
all their PSE positions involved in expanding service levels or 
special projects.
Rural Areas
Rural areas and governments served by balance of state 
prime sponsors9 stand out from other types of governments 
in two ways. First, they showed the highest levels of displace 
ment. Second, when they used PSE to create jobs, they were
Table 3-5
Percentage Distribution of Net Employment Effects by Type of Jurisdiction
December 1979
Effect
Large
distressed
cities
Other 
large 
cities
Small cities
and suburban
counties
Rural and 
balance of 
state areas
Hsr
o0*
o£3
HH
3 •o
ot-t-
O
C/3 
W
Job creation .................... 82
New programs and services ..... 13
Expansion of existing services ... 22
Special projects ............... 4
Program maintenance.......... 42
Job displacement................ 18
Total ...................... 100
Addendum: 
Number of jobs ...............___14,949
NOTE: Totals may not add due to founding.
90
11
38
6
34
10
100
17,052
84
15
32
20
16
16
100
3,021
69
10
41
10
8
31
100
1,149
The Job Creation Impact of PSE 71
more likely than other governments to do so by expanding 
existing services.
Two reasons account for these findings. First, in many of 
these areas the primary users of PSE were local governments 
and school districts; very few nonprofit organizations were 
available to employ PSE workers. Second, the governments 
themselves perform more limited functions than govern 
ments in large cities, so that PSE participants were more like 
ly to be employed in basic service areas.
A major use of PSE participants in these areas involved 
the provision of deputies for small towns and county 
sheriffs' offices. For example, a town may have had a single 
police officer. Often for the price of sending a person to 
police cadet school, the sheriff could have a force of deputies 
funded out of PSE. The citizens had more police protection 
and the town council was happy. When they finished their 
PSE jobs, the individual participants were often hired direct 
ly by the town or county in their existing jobs. PSE par 
ticipants were also used in these areas as jailers or matrons in 
the county jail or as workers on the county road crews—both 
primary and important functions of small rural govern 
ments. In many of these situations, the use of the PSE 
worker constituted displacement.
The other prevalent kind of employment in rural areas was 
in clerical positions, such as clerks in the state police bar 
racks and the county courthouse or dispatchers in the 
sheriff's office. Depending on the circumstances, the 
associate would classify these uses as either expansions of ex 
isting functions or, if the positions would otherwise have 
been funded out of local revenue, displacement.
The following reports from associates in two rural coun 
ties typify the kind of classification decision that had to be 
made:
I put the county ambulance service in the displace 
ment category. The state now mandates that the
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ambulance service exist and thus the county has no 
real choice. I believe that they would have found 
the money even though it would have been dif 
ficult; however, the CETA program clearly made it 
easier for them to comply with the state mandate. 
In the most prosperous county, I have also put 
three deputy sheriffs under displacement since the 
county has now become very dependent on them 
and could probably afford to hire them.
The activities classified as displacement are highly 
diverse. To start with some of the more obvious, 
the county has acquired a mechanic and a 
mechanic's assistant to maintain county vehicles. 
This would otherwise be contracted out. Two 
townships are using PSE slots for assessor aides to 
help with two reassessments mandated by law. 
Without the PSE people, this would probably have 
to be hired out. The county is using a PSE person 
as liaison with the state police and has an additional 
three PSE slots in the county sheriff's office. I 
judged all of these to be potential hires because 
they are long term positions and staff additions 
have been made around the PSE slots.
Variation by Degree of Fiscal Pressure
Over the four rounds of field observations, the degree of 
fiscal pressure proved to be an important determinant of 
both the proportion of PSE slots retained by the sample 
governments and the net employment effects of the pro 
gram. Associates were asked to judge the degree of fiscal 
pressure faced by the sample governments according to the 
following categories:
Extreme Fiscal Pressure: Previous service levels had 
been cut back to essential services. Own-source local 
revenue and anticipated external sources of revenue
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were insufficient to meet the demands for those services 
and there was no apparent source of increases in locally 
raised revenue in the coming year or so.
Moderate Fiscal Pressure: Anticipated own-source local 
revenue and external sources were expected to be insuf 
ficient to support the existing level of services. Main 
taining the level of services in the jurisdiction would re 
quire a difficult positive action such as a new tax source, 
a significant increase in tax rates, or cuts in service 
levels.
Little Fiscal Pressure: Anticipated internal and external 
revenue (using existing sources with possible small rate 
increases) are expected to cover anticipated expenditures 
increases and service demands.
No Fiscal Pressure: The jurisdiction was experiencing 
increases in existing surpluses or had made voluntary 
tax cuts. There was no difficulty in meeting expected 
demands for essential services with existing internal and 
external revenue sources and tax rates.
In explaining how they classified a jurisdiction, associates 
provided both objective data and narrative statements. The 
former included data on the trend of year-end cash balances, 
the rate of growth of taxes and expenditures, the presence or 
absence of fund deficits, the use of short-term borrowing, in 
creases or decreases in the tax base, the current bond rating, 
and increases or decreases in tax rates. The latter category in 
cluded assessments by local officials of the capacity of the 
jurisdiction to expand activities or add new programs or ser 
vices and the legal or political feasibility of a tax increase. 
The following excerpts from associate reports indicate the 
varying degrees of fiscal pressure in three of the sample 
cities.
From a large distressed city:
The city finds itself under extreme fiscal pressure. 
Several factors contribute to this conclusion, leaving lit-
574 The Job Creation Impact of PSE
tie doubt to the validity of this assessment. Significant 
to this discussion are the following:
1. Increasing dependence on nonlocally raised revenues.
2. A shrinking population, resulting in a shrinking tax 
base and an increasingly dependent population.
3. Continued and increasing layoffs of city employees.
4. Reduced ability to borrow because of the bond 
ratings.
. Negative local assessment of the city's ability to raise 
more tax revenues; the city's tax rate is four times the 
state average.
6. A predicted budget shortfall. 
From a large city under moderate fiscal pressure:
Uncertainty about the city's fiscal health led Standard 
and Poors to downgrade the city's long-term bonds 
from AA to A-plus. The mayor's response in the 1980 
budget was an unusually stringent fiscal program: only 
a 1 percent increase in the total budget; a personnel cut 
back of about 1,500 positions; a bundle of increased 
fees, charges, and taxes expected to yield about $100 
million in new revenues; plus an $82 million increase in 
the 1979 tax levy—the first such increase since the early 
1970s. This was the nastiest medicine any mayor had 
spooned out for a long time, but the general reaction 
was that higher taxes had to be swallowed in order to 
avoid New York- or Cleveland-style fiscal pneumonia.
From a large city with little fiscal pressure:
This rating was given for the following reasons:
1. A triple-A bond rating by both Standard and Poors 
and Moody.
2. Continued cash surpluses.
3. A stable nominal tax rate.
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4. A stable assessment ratio.
5. Continued expansion of the tax base.
6. Low debt ratios.
7. A decrease in the expenditure growth rate.
8. A relatively low level of economic dependence on ex 
ternal funds.
9. Conservative fiscal and budgetary policies.
As of the third round of field observations in 1979, just 
under half of the governments in the sample were 
characterized as under relatively little or no fiscal pressure, 
35 percent under moderate pressure, and 17 percent under 
extreme pressure. Reflecting the deterioration in the national 
economy, fiscal conditions worsened in 19 of the sample 
governments between the 1979 and 1980 observations, with 
30 percent characterized as under relatively light or no fiscal 
pressure, 40 percent under moderate pressure, and 22 per 
cent under extreme pressure in 1980.
As expected, the portion of PSE slots retained by the sam 
ple governments (as opposed to subcontracting with non 
profit organizations and other local governments) varied 
directly with fiscal pressure. By round four of the field 
observations, the sample governments under extreme fiscal 
pressure retained just over half of the PSE slots, compared 
to 43 percent and 39 percent for the governments under 
moderate and relatively light or no fiscal pressure, respec 
tively.
Information on net employment effects by degree of fiscal 
pressure is presented in table 3-6. Not surprisingly, the 
jurisdictions facing extreme fiscal pressure had the highest 
proportions of positions devoted to maintaining and expan 
ding existing services and had relatively little displacement. 
No positions in any of these jurisdictions were judged to be 
assigned to special projects.
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Table 3-6
Percentage Distribution of Net Employment Effects
Within Sample Governments Only
by Degree of Fiscal Pressure
December 1979
Degree of fiscal pressure
Effect
Job creation ...............
New programs or services . . 
Expansion of existing 
services ...............
Special projects ..........
Program maintenance .....
Extreme
94
7 
30
1
56
Moderate
69
3 
13
3
50
Little or 
none
82
12
27
30
13
Total ................ 100 100 100
Jurisdictions with little or no fiscal pressure had the 
highest proportions of special projects and had relatively lit 
tle program maintenance. The largest proportion of the posi 
tions was used to provide new services or to expand existing 
services.
Jurisdictions with moderate fiscal pressure had the highest 
proportion of displacement (almost one-third of the posi 
tions). Four-fifths of the PSE positions retained by the sam 
ple government in these jurisdictions were in the category of 
program maintenance or displacement. It should be 
remembered that the definition of moderate fiscal pressure 
was that existing local revenue would soon be insufficient to 
support existing service levels, requiring either a tax increase 
or a cut in services. Obviously, to those possibilities must be 
added the use of federal PSE funds to fill the gap and pro 
vide fiscal relief.
The Job Creation Impact of PSE 77
The Fiscal Effects of PSE
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the job creation 
effect and the fiscal impact of the PSE program are 
somewhat different issues. Displacement may reduce the 
amount of direct job creation, but whether or not there is a 
fiscal stimulus depends upon how the jurisdiction uses the 
funds freed up through displacement. If the released funds 
are used to expand services elsewhere in the government, the 
fiscal effect would still be one of higher expenditures in the 
public sector, even if there is less direct job creation than 
desired. Alternatively, if the released funds are used to 
reduce or stabilize taxes, there would still be a stimulus ef 
fect, but its initial impact would be in the private sector; the 
nature and magnitude of the effect would be similar to that 
of a federal tax cut.
While the primary concern of the field evaluation study 
was with the direct employment effects of PSE in the public 
sector, an attempt was made to determine, to the extent 
possible, how jurisdictions used the funds released by 
displacement.
Local revenue freed by displacement uses of PSE can be 
used in one of three basic ways:
1. Avoiding an increase in local taxes—that is, tax 
stabilization.
2. Spending the freed local money on other employment or 
capital projects.
3. Allowing the money to accumulate as idle fund 
balances.
The first of these alternatives allows the unused local 
money to stay in the pockets of taxpayers while maintaining 
government spending. The second lets the government in 
crease discretionary spending. Only the third alternative has
78 The Job Creation Impact of PSE
no immediate stimulative impact on either the private or 
public sectors.
As of the third round of field observations, 14 percent of 
all the PSE slots encompassed by the field research and 20 
percent of the slots retained by the sample governments were 
identified as displacement uses of PSE. Of the money saved 
by the sample governments through displacement, the field 
associates estimated that approximately 40 percent was ac 
counted for by tax stabilization. Almost one-fourth of the 
money was used to increase local spending in other ways 
(mostly for locally funded government employment), and 
the same proportion was set aside in fund balances. About 
one-eighth (12 percent) could not be allocated to any of these 
fiscal effects.
The use of local funds freed by displacement for tax 
stabilization is understandable. Local officials are reluctant 
to raise taxes even when costs rise; if PSE can fill the gap, 
there is a motivation for displacement. A number of reports 
indicate this sort of position. From a suburban county:
For the most part, displacement by local govern 
ment has had a tax stabilizing effect. The fiscal ef 
fects of increasing population growth have not 
totally offset the costs of increased service delivery 
demands, especially in the smaller municipalities. 
Displaced positions primarily represent essential 
protective services. PSE and increased county 
capabilities have "temporarily" delayed the in 
evitable—a millage increase.
As noted earlier, the situation in rural areas was somewhat 
different from that of the cities. Some of the displacement in 
these areas was the result of mandated services that had no 
revenue sources associated with them. The following is an 
example from a rural county:
I put all the ambulance service employees under 
"tax stabilization" since I have reasoned that if
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they are displacement then the money would have 
to come from somewhere if CETA did not exist and 
the only place it could come from is a tax increase 
for the support of the ambulance services. Indeed, 
this is one of the few categories where a tax increase 
would even be legal since the county is already at 
the legal limit in most other taxing categories. Since 
the program is mandated by the state, I suppose a 
tax increase to support this service would have been 
necessary.
Although tax reduction (as distinguished from the avoidance 
of a tax increase) was not very prevalent, one place it occur 
red was a smaller city where the associate reasoned as 
follows:
The conclusion that these funds represent tax 
reduction is based on: (1) declining municipal tax 
rates; (2) the mayor's public commitment to lower 
ing tax rates; (3) the ability to finance desired ex 
penditures through a growing tax base; and (4) an 
explicit statement by a local official that CETA 
money has reduced the sewer tax rate.
Summary of Field Research Findings
Viewed over the four rounds of field observations be 
tween July 1977 and December 1980, the impact of PSE can 
be summarized as follows:
1. Overall, displacement uses of PSE remained consistent 
ly low, ranging from 18 percent as of July 1977 to 11 
percent as of December 1980. Among the factors con 
tributing to the low displacement rate were changes in 
legislation affecting wage supplementation, tenure 
limits, and tighter eligibility criteria. A shift in institu 
tional arrangements, with an increasing share of PSE 
slots subcontracted to nonprofit organizations, also 
kept the displacement rate down.
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2. In terms of job creation, program maintenance uses of 
PSE accounted for roughly half of the positions located 
in school districts and the sample governments as of 
December 1979 and increased generally across all 
employing agencies between 1979 and 1980. Outside of 
nonprofit organizations, few participants were pro 
viding new services, with expansions of existing services 
accounting for most of the other job creation uses of 
PSE.
3. Primarily because of the training requirements in Title 
II-D, but also because of the ability to supplement wage 
levels in Title VI, the latter became the preferred title 
among the sample governments—although, overall, the 
proportion they retained of both titles declined steadily 
between 1977 and 1980.
4. Among the sample governments, the extent of displace 
ment was highest in rural areas. In part this reflects the 
fact that these governments retained higher proportions 
of their PSE positions, and tended to use them to pro 
vide basic services.
5. The proportion of PSE slots used for program 
maintenance increased with the degree of fiscal 
pressure, while jurisdictions facing moderate fiscal 
pressure had the highest displacement rate among posi 
tions in the sample governments.
6. Of local funding for which the PSE funds substituted, 
approximately two-fifths was accounted for by tax 
stabilization uses.
7. The rest of the funds were split between expenditure in 
other areas and increased fund balances, each account 
ing for slightly less than one-fourth of the substitution 
uses of the funds.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
A Statistically Based Analysis 
of the Job Creation Impact of PSE
As a follow-up to the field evaluation research, a statistical 
analysis of the job creation impact of PSE was performed 
for a group of 30 large cities, including some that were 
covered in the field research and others that were not. The 
results of that analysis are presented in this section and com 
pared to the findings from the field research and earlier 
econometric studies of PSE.
Previous Econometric Studies
The most important previous econometric studies on the 
employment effects of public service employment programs 
were conducted by George Johnson and James Tomola, 
starting with PEP, the precursor to CETA-PSE. Johnson 
and Tomola estimated in a paper presented in 1975 that the 
displacement rate under PEP rose from 39 percent in the 
first quarter of the program to 67 percent after two years. 10 
A more recent study by the same authors covering public 
employment under the PEP program and its continuation 
through the end of 1975 under CETA-PSE estimated 
displacement at 0 percent after one quarter, 58 percent after 
one year, and 100 percent after one-and-one-half years. 11
Among reviewers of this work, there was a consensus that 
the results were highly volatile depending on the particular 
specification of the model used. In examining the Johnson 
and Tomola data, Michael Wiseman estimated that, depend 
ing upon the assumptions made, the rate of displacement 
after one year varied from 0 to 80 percent. 12 Similarly, 
Michael Borus and Daniel Hamermesh, in a paper for the 
National Commission on Employment Policy, stressed the 
volatility of the Johnson-Tomola findings.
We have seen that the precision of the econometric 
analyses is illusory. The estimates of job creation
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and fiscal substitution have large confidence 
bounds so that the actual rates can lie within a very 
broad range of values. The estimates are based on 
the assumptions and model specification of their 
authors. Changes in these assumptions or models 
will drastically affect the magnitude of job creation 
and fiscal substitution rates. 13
In a later study using cross-sectional data on states, cities, 
and counties, Laurie Bassi and Alan Fechter concluded that, 
while PSE results in substantial job creation in the short run, 
over the long run such effects are significantly reduced. 14 In 
reporting their findings, Bassi and Fechter were careful to 
note the problems that they, too, encountered in attempting 
to isolate the independent budgetary effects of PSE. In the 
case of cities, for example, they attempted to estimate the 
impact of PSE on real wage expenditures through an equa 
tion which included as explanatory variables the real wage 
bill and local personal income for the previous year, PSE, all 
other federal grants, and a price index for city wages. Com 
menting on the results obtained for 1975 and 1976, the 
authors noted, "Overall the results of these experiments 
were disappointing . . . The parameters of all the variables 
were quite unstable, shifting dramatically between 1975 and 
1976. When the CETA variable had a plausible parameter, 
as it did in the 1976 sample, it was statistically 
insignificant." 15
Among the complicating factors in the Bassi-Fechter study 
were the imprecise methods used in estimating the wage bill 
variable and in combining this variable with the other 
budgetary data in the model. With respect to measurement, 
the annual wage bill was estimated by multiplying wages paid 
in October by a factor of 12. In turn, this calendar-year 
salary and wage estimate was applied to other budgetary 
data, which due to the wide range of fiscal-year accounting 
periods used by cities, varied significantly from city to city as 
to the calendar-year time periods encompassed. 16
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Additional measurement problems involved estimates of 
the PSE variable. In particular, failure to appropriately ad 
just PSE funds received by a city for amounts passed on to 
other governments or nonprofit agencies through subcon 
tracting arrangements caused the job creation impact 
estimated on the basis of city wage and salary expenditures 
to be biased downward. 17
Integrating Field Research 
and Statistical Estimation
The statistically based estimates of the job creation impact 
of PSE undertaken in conjunction with the Brookings- 
Princeton field research involved pooled time-series data on 
30 large cities for the period 1970 through 1979. Before turn 
ing to a detailed discussion of the analysis underlying these 
findings, it is worth noting how the statistical effort im 
proves on earlier attempts to gauge the net job creation im 
pact of PSE and, in particular, how the field network evalua 
tion research provided a more informed basis upon which to 
structure the statistical analysis.
Avoiding Measurement Error
One contribution of the field research was to help avoid 
potential measurement error associated with the data used in 
the statistical analysis. The results of the field research in 
dicated that use of PSE allocations to individual cities (the 
measure used by Bassi and Fechter) would cause a downward 
bias in the estimated job creation impact of PSE for two 
reasons. First, cities subcontracted substantial parts of their 
PSE money to other jurisdictions and to nonprofit organiza 
tions. During the second round of field observations, for ex 
ample, subcontracting was reported to have accounted for 48 
percent of total PSE outlays by the jurisdictions in the field 
network evaluation study.
A further bias from using allocations data concerns the 
fact that, as reported by the field associates, the rate at which 
PSE funds were actually spent varied significantly from city
84 The Job Creation Impact of PSE
to city, and for each city varied from one time period to 
another. This information made it clear that reliable net job 
creation estimates would require city-specific PSE expen 
diture data rather than data on gross allocations of PSE 
funds from the Department of Labor.
Model Specification
The current study focuses on the operating side of city 
budgets. In theory, PSE-related workers could substitute for 
capital resources, but the field research found no such 
substitution.
The field research provided further guidance by indicating 
that any statistical model for gauging the net job creation im 
pact would have to be sensitive to program maintenance uses 
of PSE—that is, using PSE funds to cushion reductions in 
local employment. Particularly among the larger and more 
fiscally distressed cities, the field associates reported 
substantial use of PSE to ease such cutbacks, and such uses 
are more likely to be captured in a cross-sectional data base 
than one based strictly on time-series data.
Additional insights from the field research helped identify 
appropriate control variables in estimating the net job crea 
tion impact of PSE. In particular, the diversity of fiscal cir 
cumstances among localities that was reported by the field 
associates argued strongly for including a fiscal stress 
variable. It also became obvious that another dimension that 
would have to be controlled was the variety of organizational 
structures and range of functional responsibility among large 
cities.
On balance, the field research suggested that a pooled 
time-series model using city-specific PSE expenditure data 
would provide better control for structural differences 
among cities than had been achieved in earlier cross-sectional 
studies, as well as greater sensitivity to spending cutbacks 
than had been achieved in earlier aggregated time-series 
analyses.
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Modeling Salary and Wage Outlays
For this study, 18 the principal dependent variable for gaug 
ing the net job creation impact of PSE is salary and wage 
outlays. To the extent that PSE adds to total employment by 
large cities, a positive correlation would be expected between 
PSE funds and these outlays. 19 In order to gauge the in 
dependent effects of PSE, however, it is necessary to identify 
and control for the effects of other factors that have an in 
fluence on salaries and wages. For this purpose, an equation 
was specified consisting of five principal elements.
1. Per-Capita Personal Income. This variable controls for 
the effects of variations in local economies on the provision 
of local public services. Assuming that community welfare 
derives from consumption of both private and public goods 
and services and that communities seek to maximize welfare 
in relation to available resources, then spending on public 
services and, in turn, public employment will vary directly 
with local income.
2. Per-Capita State Grants, PSE Grants, and Other 
Federal Grants. To the extent that such grants add generally 
to total operating expenditures, one would expect them to 
also increase salary and wage outlays. With respect to other 
federal grants we constructed separate series for the 1970-74 
period and for the 1975-79 period. This partitioning was 
made to take account of the changing nature of these grants. 
In the later period there was a greater emphasis on operating 
as opposed to capital grants, as well as increased use of a 
block grant design, which permits greater local discretion in 
the use of both capital and operating grants.
3. Fiscal Stress Condition. The degree of fiscal stress 
varies considerably among cities. To the extent fiscal stress is 
related to the propensity of cities to consume public services, 
the income coefficient in the salary and wage equation will
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perform less well as the fiscal stress characteristics of a city 
depart from the norm. Accordingly, a fiscal stress ranking 
was included in the equation. Specifically, cities were 
grouped into four fiscal stress categories, ranging from 1 
(low fiscal stress) to 4 (high stress). The ranking was based 
on each city's fiscal 1975 ratio of unearmarked cash and 
security holdings (net of outstanding short term debt) to its 
total general operating outlays.
Per capita wage and salary outlays were observed to vary 
from an average of $80 for the five cities in the lowest fiscal 
stress group in 1970 to $187 for the seven cities in the highest 
fiscal stress group. Over time inflation was likely to exag 
gerate this gap between high and low fiscal stress cities so we 
combined the fiscal stress classifications with an inflation in 
dex based on the National Income Accounts price deflator 
for the state and local government sector.
4. Fiscal Structure. Because long-run tax and spending 
behavior may be systematically influenced by differences in 
local fiscal structures, we included a variable constructed as 
the ratio of property to total taxes in 1970. 20
5. Adjustment for Organizational Differences. In order to 
control for the effect of organizational differences among 
cities on the scope of public services provided and, in turn, 
the level of salary and wage outlays, a separate site dummy 
was specified for each city included in the pooled time-series 
data base.
Data
The salary and wage equation was fitted to a pooled time- 
series data base for 30 cities covering fiscal 1970 through 
fiscal 1979. The 30 cities were those for which reliable 
estimates could be made of direct expenditures of PSE funds 
for salaries and wages of PSE participants hired by the city 
itself, as opposed to participants subcontracted to other
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governments or nonprofit organizations. Information per 
taining to PSE spending on city workers was obtained from 
unpublished worksheets developed by the Governments 
Division of the Bureau of the Census in conjunction with its 
annual compilation of revenue and expenditure data for the 
nation's largest cities. 21
One shortcoming in the PSE expenditure data derived 
from the worksheets is the incomplete accounting of PSE- 
funded expenditures for program administration. Such ex 
penses, including salaries, were limited to 10 percent of the 
grant. Except for cities that administered their programs 
through contractual arrangements, such uses show up in 
PSE-related salary and wage expenditures along with direct 
expenditures for PSE participants. This shortcoming may 
cause some downward bias in the estimated net job creation 
impact of PSE.
Data on the other intergovernmental grant variables, the 
tax-base composition variable, and the salary and wage 
outlay variable were taken directly from the computerized 
data base associated with the annual financial survey con 
ducted by the Governments Division of the Bureau of the 
Census. The salary and wage variable reflects actual annual 
outlays and is measured within the same 12-month account 
ing period as the PSE expenditure variable.
Estimating Procedures
The salary and wage equation was fitted to the pooled 
time-series data base using an ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimating procedure. A crucial assumption in using or 
dinary least squares is that PSE enters as an exogenous 
variable and is not a direct function of the salary and wage 
variable. Based on the nature of the PSE funding formula, 
this appears to be a reasonable assumption; that is, employ 
ment and poverty factors, not spending levels per se, deter 
mine each city's allocation. Moreover, a city's allocation and
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the rate at which it draws down that allocation are highly 
variable across cities and at different times within a city.
The appropriateness of an OLS estimating procedure was 
also assessed in terms of the residuals that resulted from fit 
ting the salary and wage equation to the pooled time-series 
data base. For individual cities, a distinct pattern of suc 
cessive over- or underprediction was observed in several 
cases for the period of 1970 to 1976. Of particular concern 
was the possibility of an inherent tendency toward over- or 
underprediction during the ensuing 1977-79 period which 
might bias the estimated PSE impacts. A city-specific time 
trend variable for those cities whose residuals indicated a 
strong tendency toward positive serial correlation was in 
cluded to control this basis. 22 A statistically significant trend 
was found in seven of the 30 cities, and time trend variables 
for these cities were included in the final specification.
Estimated Impacts of PSE
The results of fitting the salary and wage equation to the 
pooled time-series data base are shown in table 3A-1. Turn 
ing first to the per capita income variable, a highly signifi 
cant relationship is indicated with each additional $100 of 
per-capita personal income estimated to result in an addi 
tional $1.30 in local government salary and wage outlays.
A positive and statistically significant distinction is found 
between the spending patterns and the fiscal stress variable. 
Cities characterized as under high fiscal stress are estimated 
to have spent $62 more per capita on salary and wages in 
1970 than cities under low fiscal stress. Given an adjustment 
based on the price deflator for state and local expenditures, 
the differential increases to $123 by 1979.
The tax composition variable, which reflects the propor 
tion of total taxes in 1970 accounted for by the property tax, 
exhibits a negative and statistically significant relationship 
with salary and wage outlays. Specifically, each additional
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percentage point decrease in the share of total taxes ac 
counted for by the property tax is estimated to result in an in 
crease of $.85 in per-capita salary and wage outlays.
Table 3A-1
Estimated Salary and Wage Equation
From a Pooled Time-Series Analysis
of Thirty Large Cities, 1970-79
Dependent variables City salary and wage outlays
Independent variables
Personal income + .0130
(6.42)
Fiscal stress classification +20.4719
(7.14)
Property to total taxes, 1970 -.8476
(3.91)
Other federal grants 1970-74 + .0085
(0.16)
Other federal grants 1975-79 + .0447
(1.05)
State grants + .2753
(10.79)
Public service employment grants, 1977 + .2994
(1.58)
Public service employment grants, 1978 + .7669
(4.34)
Public service employment grants, 1979 + .7140 
____________________________________(3.34)
NOTES: 1. All economic and budgetary data are in per capita terms.
2. Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses.
3. Also included in the salary and wage equation, but not reported above were a 
series of city-specific place dummies and time trend variables.
4. The other federal grants variables include PSE of PSE-type grants through 
fiscal 1976.
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There is no evidence of a statistically significant impact 
from other federal grants in either the 1970-74 period or the 
1975-79 period. However, a positive and statistically signifi 
cant impact on salary and wages was indicated for state 
grants to cities. Specifically, each additional dollar of state 
aid is estimated to have resulted in an additional $.28 in 
salary and wage outlays.
The marked difference between the effect of federal and 
state grants on city salary and wage outlays partly reflects the 
compositional differences between the two grant sources; 
that is, a higher proportion of state grants is devoted to 
operating uses. A second factor may have to do with the at 
titudes among cities about the two sources of aid. The results 
of this analysis strongly suggest that cities were not willing to 
become dependent on federal aid to support their payrolls. 
This may be due to the newness during this period of many 
federal programs geared to operating uses, and perhaps to a 
perception that the political process that controls federal 
grant programs is more remote and capricious compared 
with state-based assistance. This combination of newness 
and remoteness made federal aid a more uncertain source of 
revenue.
PSE grants exhibit a much different impact pattern as 
compared to the other federal grants. For each of the three 
years, the public service employment program is estimated to 
have had a stimulative effect on salary and wage outlays by 
large cities. For 1977, each additional dollar of PSE is 
estimated to have added $.30 to salary and wage outlays. 
However, with a t statistic of 1.58, this estimate is only 
marginally significant. For 1978, the PSE program is 
estimated to have had a much larger impact, with each addi 
tional dollar of PSE adding approximately $.77 to salaries 
and wages. Similarly, for 1979, each dollar of PSE is 
estimated to have added $.71 to salary and wage outlays. 
With t statistics of 4.34 and 3.34 in 1978 and 1979, respec 
tively, these estimates are significant at a 99 percent prob-
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ability level. 23 This shift to a much larger impact from PSE 
on salary and wages in 1978 and 1979 is consistent with the 
large increase in PSE outlays in 1978 and the tightening of 
the eligibility criteria and other restrictions which would 
make it more difficult to displace locally funded workers 
with PSE-funded workers.
Conclusions
The results of this statistical analysis of PSE's impact on 
salary and wage outlays by large cities in 1977, 1978, and 
1979 indicate that the program had a substantial net job 
creation impact, especially in fiscal years 1978 and 1979. 
Given the difference in the estimates between these two years 
and fiscal 1977, these results indicate a substantial effect 
from the changes in the eligibility criteria and the require 
ment of a project approach to PSE. This suggests that, to the 
extent the federal government seeks to promote job creation 
through the intergovernmental grant system to reduce either 
cyclical or structural unemployment, any grant similar to 
PSE should have fairly restrictive eligibility criteria and 
limits on the types of PSE jobs created.
In relation to earlier econometric research, this current 
study suggests that with careful attention to the specification 
of the factors underlying salary and wage behavior (in 
cluding more refined treatment of intergovernmental 
revenue and of factors related to fiscal stress, financial 
management, and institutional differences among cities) and 
with greater accuracy in the measurement of key variables, 
better estimates of net expenditure effects can be obtained.
Further, the difference between the 1977 result and those 
for 1978 and 1979 suggests that earlier concern over dif 
ferences in findings regarding substitution may have been, at 
least in part, due to the different time periods and program 
models for which the estimates were derived.
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Finally, the results of this analysis are quite consistent with 
the Brookings-Princeton field evaluation research. 
Specifically, the estimate for 1978, indicating that $.77 of 
each dollar from PSE added to salary and wage outlays, 
lends statistical reinforcement to the $.78 job creation 
estimates for large cities derived from the first two rounds of 
the Brookings-Princeton field research.
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23. In comparing these results to those reported earlier from the field 
research, it should be noted that the fiscal year estimates reported in 
table 3A-1 are derived from Governments Division data which coincide 
with accounting periods ending between July 1 of the preceding calendar 
year and June 30 of the current calendar year. Accordingly, the fiscal 
1977 coefficient reflects the impact of PSE during calendar 1976 for 
some cities, while for others it reflects the impact during the last half of 
calendar 1976 and the first half of 1977. Hence, the 1977 coefficient 
predates the estimates from the first and second rounds of the 
Brookings-Princeton study, which are more appropriately compared 
with the fiscal 1978 estimate report in table 3A-1. For similar reasons, the 
fiscal 1979 estimate in table 3A-1 (covering calendar year 1978 for some 
cities and the period July 1, 1978 to June 30, 1979 for others) cannot be 
directly compared to either of the two subsequent field observations in 
December 1979 and December 1980.

4
Public Service Employment 
as Training Policy
The previous chapter presented evidence that public ser 
vice job programs can fulfill one of the goals that has been 
put forth for them: to create jobs quickly and relatively effi 
ciently. The picture is less clear, however, when we ask about 
the lasting effects of the program on the vast numbers of 
people who held those publicly funded jobs.
In the decade from 1971 to 1981, millions of people held 
PSE jobs. It is reasonable to expect that this job experience 
resulted in some training of participants. The one study of 
net post-program experience that has been done for PSE par 
ticipants who entered the program in FY 1976 indicates that 
PSE generated about $300 per year in average earnings gains 
for participants in the first two years following their par 
ticipation in the program. This represents about a 6 percent 
gain in earnings relative to what they would have earned in 
the absence of the program and is equal to the average for all 
GET A participants. 1 This is an average result for all par 
ticipants who entered in that period of time. No study has 
been done that relates post-program experience to the kinds 
of jobs and the amount of training that particular par 
ticipants received. However, the results of the field research 
provide some indication of the kind of training provided to 
whom and the likely longer run effects of that experience.
The information that is available enables us to examine 
many aspects of how the PSE programs of the 1970s affected 
participants. This information is particularly valuable not
97
98 Public Service Employment as Training Policy
only because a large number of persons participated in the 
program, offering a solid data base, but also because the 
several changes in program design and in political and 
economic circumstances enable us to assess how these 
changes related to program outcomes.
Unlike many other federally supported training programs, 
PSE provided training largely as a side effect of the jobs it 
provided. Because most job training in the United States 
takes place on the job, however, there is little question that 
PSE jobs, with or without supplemental training, could help 
participants develop both general and specific job skills. Not 
all work experience is equally valuable, of course, so a major 
question is whether the program as it was implemented met 
some minimal criteria for effective training.
Chief among these criteria is that the program must enroll 
those who can make gains from the experience. Next, the 
participants should be effectively matched with training op 
portunities. This is a particularly difficult step because both 
the job level and the characteristics of participants are in 
fluenced by policy changes such as altering the participant 
eligibility requirements or setting a maximum wage. If par 
ticipants are already fully trained for the positions they 
hold—or, at the other extreme, if they are so ill-prepared 
that they cannot learn the jobs—then the on-the-job training 
gains will not be great. Finally, if a program is to succeed, 
the jobs must require skills that will be useful in obtaining 
unsubsidized employment. PSE would fail as an effective 
training program if it succeeded only in training the 
equivalent of the proverbial buggy whip makers!
Matching Needs with Opportunities
A critical feature of the PSE program under CETA was 
the attempt to target positions to those who would otherwise 
be unemployed and who could also make significant long 
term gains from involvement with the program. By adjusting
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the eligibility regulations, the federal government attempted 
to fine tune the program to both attain maximum training ef 
fectiveness and stimulate the economy without creating in 
flation.
The theoretical case for this targeting rests indirectly on 
the notion that there are frictions, immobilities, and 
rigidities in the labor market which prevent the free and in 
stantaneous adjustment of wages and employment to current 
labor market conditions. Such imperfections mean that 
when labor market conditions change—as when demand for 
some occupation goes down while demand for other occupa 
tions rises—the result will be not just changes in wages for 
the different occupations but also unemployment. The 
unemployment will be concentrated in certain geographic 
areas, among unskilled workers, or among persons who are 
discriminated against in some way.
The relatively high unemployment rates of certain groups 
is evidence that such target groups exist. Minorities, persons 
with less than a high school education, and teenagers are 
much more likely to be unemployed than are whites of prime 
working age. Even when members of these groups are 
employed, they are much more likely to hold unskilled, low- 
paying jobs.
Several theories about the labor market have been offered 
to explain these obervations. These theories differ in many 
respects, but they all agree that those with few or no skills are 
more likely to be unemployed or frequently laid off while 
those with high levels of skill are in greater demand.
One such theory stresses the importance of restrictions on 
wages, especially laws setting a minimum wage. According 
to this theory, if Congress or a legislature sets a minimum 
wage that is higher than some employers are willing to pay 
for certain jobs and some workers are willing to accept lower 
wages for those jobs, then fewer jobs will be available. If the
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number of people seeking jobs exceeds the number of 
available jobs, employers will hire those with greater skills 
and leave the least skilled without jobs.
A different approach leading to a similar conclusion is 
taken by those who see the labor market as segmented. 
Workers in the lowest-status jobs, in this view, are unable to 
move up because they lack education and training, or 
because they face discrimination, or because their behavior is 
unsuited to the demands of better jobs, or for all of these 
reasons. Because they are hired only for low-skilled jobs, 
they cannot obtain on-the-job training that will help them 
break out of their inferior status. The forces that keep these 
people in low-paid jobs—what is known as the secondary 
sector of the labor market—can create an excess of labor in 
this sector even when skilled jobs are available.
Both these theories agree that the high unemployment 
rates among teenagers, minorities, and unskilled workers are 
due to involuntary unemployment. There are, however, 
some who staunchly maintain that voluntary turnover ex 
plains these rates, and that unemployment among these 
groups would be reduced if the market were allowed to work 
without restriction. This type of argument is based either on 
the view that market imperfections are not significant or on 
the contention that the proposed cures are worse than the 
problems.
This is not the place to settle the differences among these 
theories. It is important to recognize, however, that the case 
for targeting rests heavily on the proposition that there is in 
voluntary unemployment, and that those who are involun 
tarily unemployed face structural labor market barriers and 
lack skills needed for available jobs. A job creation program 
for these workers does not create inflationary pressures or 
draw workers into public employment at the expense of the 
private sector. This condition makes public service employ 
ment desirable as a countercyclical job creation remedy.
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Since the same people are experiencing severe labor market 
difficulties, they also stand to gain from the job experience. 
Thus, targeting to those who have low earnings and a history 
of unemployment is often supported as both a counter 
cyclical and structural policy objective.
The theoretical defense for targeting is relatively simple 
compared to the problems faced in actually defining and 
reaching a target group. At the point of implementation one 
must abandon references to structural unemployment, un 
skilled labor, and the economically disadvantaged in favor 
of some measurable characteristics that can be used to deter 
mine who is and who is not eligible for programs. One ap 
proach is to use race, sex, and age as criteria. Although a 
relatively high proportion of some population groups may 
experience labor market difficulties, simply being a member 
of the demographic group is not sufficient evidence of need. 
In order for PSE to be effective as a training program, it 
should be aimed at those with relatively low incomes and a 
high probability of unemployment, regardless of economic 
conditions. This means the program must use eligibility re 
quirements that indicate individual labor market problems.
Even among those who experience difficulties in the labor 
market there are important differences in need and ability to 
benefit from training. The notion of targeting may be 
clarified if we think in terms of labor market layers or 
segments which, while not rigorously defined, are concep 
tually useful. 2 At the top are those workers who hold regular 
jobs and do not require any special labor market assistance. 
The second tier could be those who have some skills and 
often hold good jobs but who are the first to be laid off in a 
recession. This could be the case because of lack of seniority, 
employment in cyclically sensitive industries such as building 
construction, or relatively low skill. Their need for assistance 
is usually brief and may be met by income transfers or tem 
porary employment.
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At the third level are those workers who experience more 
difficult long term problems. They are unable to secure per 
manent employment because they lack job skills, because 
they face discrimination, or because they do not know where 
to look for jobs that may be open to them. People in these 
circumstances are likely to have low incomes and periodic 
long stretches of unemployment even in prosperous times. 
Even though they may have adequate basic education and 
are willing to work, they need training and job exposure that 
will given them entry to more stable employment.
The very bottom layer of the labor pool consists of those 
who lack the basic skills necessary for holding permanent 
jobs. Their deficiencies may extend to communication skills 
and the ability to work independently. In some cases they 
may have attitudinal or emotional problems that stand in the 
way of holding good jobs. Such workers are most in need of 
highly structured programs in remedial education, basic 
work habits, or rudimentary job skills.
Our observations of the PSE program over several years 
and in a variety of jurisdictions lead us to the conclusion that 
matching participants with positions for the purpose of 
training is one of the most difficult policy objectives to im 
plement. Generally, it is our opinion that the most ap 
propriate target group for a PSE program is the third labor 
market layer. The top two groups do not need the training 
that can be readily provided through public employment, 
and the bottom layer needs training that is best provided in 
another setting. After all, PSE participants must be able to 
hold jobs. From observing the system in action we have also 
come to believe that the questions of who should be involved 
and how they can best be reached in a decentralized system 
were both misunderstood and confused with other program 
purposes. The following sections trace our observations dur 
ing two distinct phases of the program's history.
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PSE as a Training Program, 1976-78
As the previous chapters explained, the lessons to be 
drawn from the PSE program can best be understood if we 
look at three distinct phases: one before 1976, when eligibili 
ty rules were loose; a second between 1976 and 1979, when 
new rules imposed some targeting; and the final phase after 
1979, when the stringent eligibility requirements enacted in 
1978 took effect and limited the program to those with low 
skills and long histories of unemployment.
Before 1976, PSE probably drew most of its enrollees 
from the first and second tiers of the labor market. Some ex 
cellent training opportunities were created during this time, 
but it is our conclusion that most participants did not really 
need training to locate and hold permanent jobs.
The story of PSE as a training effort thus begins in 1976, 
when Congress created the short term "projects" segment of 
the program and introduced eligibility requirements, shifting 
the program's emphasis toward the long term unemployed. 
During this period, as noted in chapter 2, local governments 
created jobs in a wide range of occupations and in several 
important functional areas. This distribution by occupation 
and function suggests that many jobs were created requiring 
skills that could be used in regular unsubsidized employ 
ment.
Further, most PSE participants during this period were 
assigned to real jobs in regular local government depart 
ments, rather than to training programs. In fact, as discussed 
in chapter 2, the services provided by these local areas were 
highly valued by the local officials. Because little formal 
training was provided, we must look at the effects of on-the- 
job experience.
The general types of PSE experiences fall into three 
categories, each of which has definite implications with 
respect to training. First, many jurisdictions hired well-
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qualified people to fill positions that helped the jurisdiction 
meet public service needs. Unemployment was high in most 
of the sample areas and limits on wages and tenure were 
loose. As a result, PSE participants were most often chosen 
from a pool of applicants based strictly on their ability to 
perform the needed tasks. Since the pool of applicants ex 
ceeded the numberof jobs, usually by a factor of five or 
more, some local governments tried to "cream" the target 
group, selecting workers from what we would generally 
define as the second tier of the labor market. That is, most 
PSE participants needed temporary employment, not train 
ing.
The second category consisted of jobs tailored for more 
disadvantaged persons, but still with the objective of filling 
important jobs. These positions were valued by local 
jurisdictions, but did not require high skill levels. This was 
the situation for a majority of the positions in our sample 
areas during the 1976-78 period. There was a strong em 
phasis on informal training for these positions; local 
jurisdictions frequently provided extra supervision or other 
job-related aid to help the PSE participants perform at an 
acceptable level.
Finally, a significant number of positions were designed 
strictly to absorb eligible participants. The chief objective 
was to keep people busy at the least possible additional cost 
to the local jurisdiction. There were few standards for this 
type of employment beyond the ability to "show up on 
time," and even this requirement was often relaxed. Of 
ficials in many jurisdictions considered hiring some unskilled 
persons to be the price for getting other workers who could 
be used in highly valued public services. These jurisdictions 
practiced program segmentation, using one part of PSE 
(usually the sustainment portion as explained in chapter 1) to 
fill skilled positions, and the projects portion to place un 
skilled persons.
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Because local government had no incentive to provide sup 
plemental institutional training to the participants, the best 
training opportunities existed where the jobs were of impor 
tance to the locality and where supervisors were therefore 
directly concerned with the quality of the work. Many 
associates reported that the dead-end jobs with no regular 
workforce contact which were created for the most disadvan- 
taged tended to have little relevance for future employment 
and may even have stigmatized the participants. But this type 
of employment was held to a minimum in the PSE program 
of 1976-78 because local governments had a strong interest in 
the performance level of PSE employees who held these posi 
tions and made an effort to supervise the employees and to 
provide them with on-the-job training. Very early in our 
studies we saw that there was a major difficulty in targeting 
positions to those who can benefit from the training without 
going so far down the queue that the employer simply gives 
up and decides that a simple work experience program for 
the unskilled is all that can reasonably be managed.
Was PSE a good training program in 1976-78? In answer 
ing that question we should remember that job creation, not 
job training, was the primary program objective at the time. 
Furthermore, since there was very little formal training for 
the participants there is little to observe except the job ex 
perience. The PSE field associates made considerable effort 
to ascertain the extent to which participants were matched 
with jobs for the purpose of developing the participants' 
potential. But most jurisdictions had no discernible training 
policy of any type.
Even though findings on training under these cir 
cumstances are somewhat inconclusive, the thousands of in 
terviews with local officials, program operators, and GET A 
participants led us to the conclusion that out of the conflict 
between the targeting and job creation objectives of PSE, 
program aspects emerged which strengthened the program as
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a training experience. As local governments attempted to use 
PSE to provide needed public services while drawing the 
employees from among eligible persons, the governments 
found it necessary to provide a considerable amount of in 
struction in job skills. This beneficial result could not have 
existed if the pressure on targeting became so great that the 
cost of training exceeded the value of the services, or if wage 
limitations or other restrictions on job types prevented the 
local governments from creating PSE jobs in regular govern 
ment departments.
After assessing the reports of associates in 1977 we found 
that PSE was an attractive program for unemployed but 
trainable people who were willing to accept short term 
employment in the public sector. Many of the jobs created in 
this program gave participants the chance to move into per 
manent positions with the employing agency.
We also found that many employers had been pleasantly 
surprised at the quality of the program participants. They 
reported no difficulty in filling the positions with suitable 
workers who met the 1976 eligibility requirements. Of 
course, this was not the case in every jurisdiction. Some 
localities successfully avoided the population needing train 
ing, even under rather stringent requirements for eligibility. 
Others developed two-tier programs where the good training 
opportunities were reserved for those who really did not need 
training while the needy were shunted off to positions with 
little opportunity. But in spite of the fact that very few areas 
had programs that showed any direct concern for the train 
ing needs of participants, the picture was brighter than it 
seemed at first glance. Training is just as effective when it is 
done out of concern for the output as when it is done out of 
concern for the participants.
In some high-wage areas we also began to see what would 
become a typical case as the program was further restricted. 
Where the allowable PSE wage was below the standard wage
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in traditional government departments, there was little op 
portunity to create regular positions for the disadvantaged.
In a few jurisdictions where the wage was not a problem, 
there was such a negative response to all federal programs 
that PSE was never productively used. In these areas the pro 
gram gravitated to the status of a relief program for the 
poor. The jobs created as a result of the PSE grant under 
these circumstances were largely cleanup projects or simple 
repair and maintenance work. While these may have been of 
temporary value to the community, they offered little in the 
way of training.
As we have emphasized throughout, PSE was not one pro 
gram but many different programs, differing substantively 
across jurisdictions and over time. This fact becomes most 
clear when we consider PSE's training aspects. Even so, with 
the above background in mind, we can make some general 
conclusions about the drift of training in PSE as the program 
regulations changed.
The tightening of restrictions in the 1976 CETA 
reauthorization pushed the program further down the labor 
queue. Wage and other limitations helped generate more 
positions for unskilled and semiskilled workers. In most 
jurisdictions, however, enough slack remained to enable of 
ficials to create jobs in regular government departments 
where the participants would help provide valued services. It 
is our judgment that this balancing of interests was effective 
for the promotion of on-the-job training, although very little 
supplemental skill training was provided. Certainly, the 
absence of formal training programs in connection with PSE 
was one of the chief reasons Congress in 1978 attempted to 
make more of a training program out of PSE.
The Beginning of the End, 1979-80
The 1978 amendments to CETA were more than a simple 
extension of the previous trends; they forced fundamental
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program changes. Motivated by data showing that PSE did 
not draw most of its participants from the bottom tier of the 
labor market and that very little supplemental training was 
provided to PSE job holders, Congress in 1978 increased the 
training emphasis by requiring more identifiable training for 
those in the bottom labor market tiers. The most important 
provisions of the amendments were:
1. Tightening the eligibility requirements to screen out 
those who would be likely to find unsubsidized employ 
ment on their own.
2. Lowering the maximum wage and tenure limitations to 
reduce the attractiveness of PSE positions as alter 
natives to private employment.
3. Requiring prime sponsors to spend a minimum percen 
tage of the PSE allocation (up to 20 percent of the Title 
II-D grant) on training activities other than informal on- 
the-job training.
4. Requiring that an Employability Development Plan 
(EDP) be prepared for each PSE participant, which 
would constitute a plan for moving the person through a 
combination of training and work experience to some 
permanent unsubsidized job.
Perhaps the easiest effect to observe was the change in the 
characteristics of the participants, which were shown in 
chapter 2. A growing proportion of the PSE population was 
drawn from those population segments that historically have 
had greatest need of job-skills training. These include 
minorities, those with less than 12 years of education, and 
welfare recipients. Many observers saw these as positive 
changes because they reflected a growing program emphasis 
on the most disadvantaged segments of the population. Yet 
in many areas, particularly the large urban labor markets 
where the highest proportions of these same groups were 
recruited, a majority of the field associates saw this change 
as having a negative impact on training.
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It appears that the program was now aimed too low. The 
field associates confirmed our conjecture that, although PSE 
was an appropriate program to provide job skills for many 
of the unemployed, it was not suitable for those who lacked 
basic work and communication skills. In three-fourths of the 
large cities in our sample of PSE jurisdictions, the field 
associates reported significant difficulties in finding a train 
ing program that the target group could handle. Employers 
had problems with the dual challenge of keeping the par 
ticipants interested in the jobs while finding training courses 
that would noticeably improve their long-run labor market 
chances. Too many of the participants showed little interest 
in training, lacking the basic skills for entry to the programs 
and often refusing to attend. Two quotations from associate 
reports are typical of the findings:
On-the-job training, job development, or class 
room training cannot compensate for the par 
ticipants' low level of achievement when entering 
the program. As a result, the training is virtually in 
effective.
* * *
Because of widespread deficiencies among par 
ticipants, there was a heavy concentration on at 
titude, appearance, and basic language training. 
These were not sufficient to make the target group 
employable.
With the 1978 amendments, Congress apparently intended 
that the targeting and training objectives would reinforce 
each other, but in the large cities just described the two ob 
jectives appear to have been in conflict. The type of training 
that can be successfully linked with PSE-style employment in 
government or nonprofit agencies proved not to be a solu 
tion to the employment problems of the most disadvantaged. 
In fact, our overall assessment of the PSE training compo 
nent in large cities after the passage of the 1978 amendments
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was that it did not meet the basic criteria for a good training 
program. Because of the deficiencies of the participants and 
the lack of job opportunities that would provide good train 
ing, there was a near certainty of failure for on-the-job train 
ing.
In spite of the difficulties, and in compliance with the law, 
there was an increase in formal training for the disadvantag- 
ed. The actual content of this training will be discussed in the 
next section of this chapter. It is our judgment, however, 
that these training gains were more than offset by the losses 
in informal on-the-job training.
In some jurisdictions the amendments had less effect, par 
ticularly in small and more rural jurisdictions where the max 
imum PSE wage was close to or less than prevailing local 
government wages for some occupations. Many of these 
jurisdictions were able to continue hiring well-qualified par 
ticipants and placing them in government positions where 
they could work with regular government employees and 
have a chance of gaining a permanent job through turnover 
or expansion of the local government labor force. Even in 
these jurisdictions, however, the field associates expressed 
the opinion that the targeting and wage restrictions had 
reduced the potential value of PSE as preparation for long 
term employment. Again we turn to the reports for elabora 
tion:
With some success, training was linked to the PSE 
job. However, targeting seems to have pushed the 
program down to those who lack motivation to 
complete the program.
* * *
The program is geared to the most disadvantaged, 
who need training in proper work habits. This re 
quires extra supervision on the job which the 
government cannot afford to provide.
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In altering PSE to make it more of a traditional "man 
power program," Congress generated a system that was 
plagued by the same dilemma that faced the profusion of 
alphabet soup training programs for the disadvantaged in 
the 1960s and 1970s. For workers who have limited work ex 
perience, education, and motivation, inexpensive short term 
training simply does not lead to permanent employment in 
good jobs. Yet taxpayers are assumed to be unwilling to pay 
for extended and expensive training. A quick fix for high 
unemployment among the unskilled remains elusive. When 
seen in this context, the failure of PSE as a training program 
for the disadvantaged is understandable.
It should be added that PSE as a program linking training 
with work experience was never given a fair trial. The train 
ing provisions were accompanied with such restrictive par 
ticipant eligibility requirements and cost restrictions that the 
system was put under a tremendous strain. Before there was 
much opportunity to make an adjustment, the program was 
cancelled. One legacy of PSE is the frustration among local 
officials resulting from the frequent changes in program 
goals, federal regulations, the level of funding, and the 
general lack of appreciation for local circumstances.
The changes brought about by the 1978 amendments were 
a good example of the disruptions that local governments 
came to expect in the nine-year CETA experience. Before 
1979, formal training was not required for participants, and 
most workers needed only the informal training they obtain 
ed on the job. The 1978 changes were an attempt to graft for 
mal training to this process. But institutional arrangements 
and expectations cannot be expected to change quickly. 
Employers understandably resisted the shift from what they 
considered to be a perfectly adequate arrangement for 
enhancing their workforce to an emphasis on employees who 
were untrained, somewhat difficult to manage, and had to be 
given time off for training.
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Formal Training and PSE
In spite of the negative feelings that local officials had 
toward the 1978 amendments, most made an effort to com 
ply with the provisions specifying that a certain portion of 
the PSE grant be spent for formal training. In the fourth and 
final round of the field network study, associates examined 
the extent of this training by looking at a sample of 50 par 
ticipants in each jurisdiction. To make the sampling pro 
cedure manageable, we first selected a random sample of 
employing agencies from each jurisdiction, stratified by PSE 
title and type of agency to reflect the local mix of PSE 
employers. We then chose a random sample of participants 
from among those in the sample agencies. We initially 
wanted a sample of 50 participants per jurisdiction for a 
total sample of 2,000. Because some smaller jurisdictions did 
not currently have 50 PSE participants, the eventual sample 
was 1,940.
Information from the sample participants' files was com 
bined with interviews with agency supervisors to provide 
four types of information:
1. Personal characteristics, including sex, age, race, and 
education; whether the participant was economically 
disadvantaged and was in a family that received public 
assistance; and the number of weeks the person had 
been unemployd before entering the program.
2. Type of PSE employer (government, school district, 
nonprofit organization, etc.), occupation of employ 
ment, and wage.
3. Type and length of PSE training, including details on 
the specific occupation for which the training was con 
ducted. For those participants who received more than 
one type of training, each type was identified, as well as 
the sequence in which they occurred.
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4. Analysis of the likelihood that the training would lead 
to direct absorption into employment with the PSE 
employing agency or significantly increase the 
likelihood of placement elsewhere.
The training for PSE participants was grouped into three 
categories: basic, specific, and general.
Basic training includes motivational training, self- 
assessment, life skills, assertiveness, time management, and 
the like, as well as training in job search and job interviewing 
skills.
Specific training is skills training for specific occupations. 
The most common training programs in this category are for 
clerical and craft occupations, although we identified more 
than 50 different types of specific training. The list of oc 
cupations ranged from bartender and radio broadcaster to 
carpenter and truck driver. The majority of occupations 
were in the traditionally lower-paid categories. For many 
participants, some basic training was combined with specific 
training. Tables 4-1 through 4-4 show these combinations, as 
well as a multiple skills training category for participants 
receiving more than one type of specific training. A majority 
of the participants in the multiple skills category had either 
clerical or craft training as one of the types.
General training includes courses that we would common 
ly classify as "education." Courses for high school or col 
lege credit, English as a second language, and adult basic 
education made up the bulk of general training.
Type and Length of Training
Table 4-1 shows the distribution of participants by type of 
training for the total sample and separately for each type of 
jurisdiction. The percentages in the tables are for the column 
totals; for example, the 32 percent at the top of the second
Table 4-1
Percentage of Participants by Type of Training and Type of Jurisdiction 
for Participants Enrolled as of December 1980
§•
C/3
rt
W
g
H 11
B.
OQ
Type of jurisdiction
Type of training
Total 
sample
Large
distressed
cities
Other 
large 
cities
Small cities
and suburban
counties
Rural 
areas
None ..................... 37
Basic only ................. 29
Skills total................. 30
Clerical ................. 3
Basic + clerical ........... 4
Subtotal............... 7
Health and social services .. 3 
Basic + health and
social services .......... 2
Subtotal............... 5
Craft ................... 5
Basic +craft ............. 3
Subtotal............... 8
Multiple skills............ 6
Other skills .............. 4
General total............... 5
General ................. 3
Basic + general ........... 2
Participant sample size ...... 1,940
32
31
31
4
1
5
3
0
3
9
4
13
3
7
6
5
2
399
36
34
26
2
6
8
1
3
4
2
5
7
5
2
4
3
1
393
33
28
34
3
5
8
3
4
7
4
2
6
8
5
5
2
3
687
47
23
25
4
2
7
3
1
4
6
1
7
5
2
5
3
2
461
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column indicates that this percentage of the sample par 
ticipants in the large distressed cities got no training.
Some form of training was provided to about five par 
ticipants out of eight (63.3 percent) although what was pro 
vided was often quite limited. This confirms the summary 
analysis of the associates, who noted that in many cases par 
ticipants were simply assigned to the PSE job. That is, the re 
quirement that a certain percentage of the funds be used for 
training was not interpreted as a requirement that every par 
ticipant receive training. Reasons for this vary, but 
associates have noted that where the participant filled a 
regular government position, agencies had trouble schedul 
ing released time for the worker to attend training sessions. 
Also, many of the participants in these jobs did not wish to 
be enrolled in supplemental training courses. In other cases 
no relevant training opportunities were available in the com 
munity.
Although the percentage receiving training was quite 
uniform across most other jurisdictional types, it was 
substantially lower than average (53 percent) in the rural 
governments. As noted earlier, the PSE program in rural 
areas was less influenced by wage restrictions than in other 
jurisdictions because community wage levels were lower than 
these areas were not as likely to be affected by union or civil 
service wage scales. Here the program continued to be used 
extensively as a supplement to basic government services. 
The lower percentage of rural participants who received 
training is consistent with our hypothesis that training would 
be less important where the program could still be used to 
provide important local services.
More than one-quarter of the sample, or 45 percent of 
those who were in some type of training, received only basic 
training. Of those who had only basic training, 54 percent 
had training for one day or less and 93 percent had training 
for ten days or less. Thus for each type of jurisdiction, 40
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percent or fewer of the participants either had any training 
or had only basic training for a few hours or days. This is a 
critical finding since it bears directly on the question of how 
much "reaP* training was given. 3
These findings are supported by the associates' narrative 
analyses. With some exceptions, the associates found that a 
minority of the participants were provided substantive skill 
training. One associate summed up what seems to have been 
a typical situation:
Some participants are placed in skill training pro 
grams but most are simply required to attend 
classes in attitude, language, and appearance train 
ing. While this may be needed, it is not enough to 
make the target group employable.
Those participants involved in specific skills training had 
jobs in a wide variety of occupational categories, but were 
clustered in typing, bookkeeping, the traditional crafts, 
nursing, and counseling. Only about 5 percent of all par 
ticipants were enrolled in general training courses, and the 
vast majority of these were in courses for high school or col 
lege credit.
Table 4-2 shows the differences in type of training by the 
personal characteristics of the trainees, including whether 
they were welfare recipients. Women were significantly more 
likely to get training than men, and those who were receiving 
public assistance had a higher probability of being in training 
programs than those who were not. Differences by race and 
age were not significant in most categories.
The most highly educated participants, especially the 7 
percent who held college degrees, were the least likely to 
receive any skill training. If they were trained, it was seldom 
in the otherwise popular clerical and craft courses. One other 
significant although not surprising finding is that while 
males dominated the training in crafts, relatively few receiv 
ed clerical training.
Public Service Em
ploym
ent as Training Policy 
117
-2
9» vo
6~
III£ I'3I£
§
^
.2 ^ 
Z
 a•s
O
v
O
v
O
^
-^
o
o
^
- 
ro
 
r
-
^
-H
io
v
O
T
j-m
ro
s
VO 
—
' 
VO <N
oo oo ^^ ro fo so m
 
rn
vo f- ro co 
ro
J5
>> "3
•a i -a
O
 
*i 
,t>
D 
o 
wi *C
c -a — Ji
lli
c
1300
'%6 o(U•o13•a 
+j
^2 
c
a, 
^
6 ja
2 
«
c/? 
u
M
 
S
H
 
^
O
 
c
Z
 
»
118 Public Service Employment as Training Policy
The most highly educated and least disadvantaged par 
ticipants, especially those who were not from families receiv 
ing welfare payments, were less likely to get job training. 
This is explained by the fact that the most highly qualified 
were placed in the best PSE jobs while the more disadvantag 
ed were relegated to a combination of low-skill work and 
training.
Less than two-thirds of the sample received any training, 
of whom nearly half (30 percent of the total sample) received 
only brief basic training. Thirty percent of the sample got 
skill training, concentrated in the clerical and craft skills, 
while another 5 percent received some general training. By 
type of jurisdiction, the major difference was that rural 
jurisdictions had a much higher proportion of participants 
with no training and a lower proportion receiving only basic 
training.
Table 4-3 shows length of training by major training ac 
tivity. As expected, those who had only a short training pro 
gram—one to ten days—had mostly basic training. Almost 
every jurisdiction in our sample had some short courses to 
motivate participants, emphasize the importance of good 
work habits, or point out some of the problems encountered 
by people seeking jobs. In one-third of the sample jurisdic 
tions, something of this sort had been set up just to "spend 
the training dollars." Many private training agencies 
established special short courses of this type and sold them to 
local governments as a package. In these courses the partici 
pant would typically get a few hours of orientation, testing 
for skills and interests, and a motivation seminar before be 
ing assigned to the PSE position. Although the associates 
generally agreed that the target group needed the basic skills 
and motivation that the short courses were designed to im 
prove, none felt that the existing programs of this type would 
do much to provide those skills.
At the other end of the spectrum, 21 percent of the sample 
had training for more than 30 days. About two-thirds of
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these participants were in clerical, craft, or multiple skills 
programs. According to the narrative descriptions of these 
programs, many of those in extended skill-training programs 
were working in PSE positions where the work was related to 
their training. Three-fourths of the associates identified this 
as the most successful PSE training strategy; at the same 
time they pointed out that local governments did not have 
the money, the opportunity, or the incentive to operate a 
program of this type for a majority of the participants. Our 
analysis also showed that the participants with extended skill 
training were about evenly spread across all types of jurisdic 
tions.
Table 4-3 
Percentage of Participants by Length of Training
and Major Training Type 
(percentage of those receiving given length of training)
Number of days of training
1 More 
_____Type of training_______None or less 2-10 10-30 than 30
None............................ 100
Skills total ......................
Clerical ........................
Craft ..........................
Multiple .......................
Other..........................
General .........................
(Total sample =1,940)
"Indicates less than 0.5 percent.
96 68
4 30
7
- 3 9
6
3
* 5
3
. 702 300 330
20
67
11
12
15
18
11
13
193
1
83
23
8
26
17
9
16
415
Training Impact
Ideally, an assessment of the effects of training would in 
clude longitudinal data for each participant so that we could
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determine post-training employment experience. Because 
this was not possible for a study of this type and has proved 
difficult even in those studies where the major objectives was 
to secure follow-up data, we approached the question of 
training impact in a different way.
For each sample participant, the associates assessed the 
degree to which formal or informal training in PSE appeared 
likely to improve the potential for transition to an unsub- 
sidized job. They were asked to consider two major factors 
in this assessment: (1) whether the training was of the type 
that might have a positive impact on employability, and 
(2) whether the participant successfully completed the train 
ing. Even though these are qualitative data, they provide 
considerable insight that cannot be gained by looking only at 
training time or considering only aggregate data.
The associates concluded that formal or informal training 
provided as part of a PSE job improved the labor market 
potential of 1,287 of the 1,940 sample participants (66 per 
cent). They were uncertain about another 431 (22 percent) 
and said that there was no improvement for only 222 (11 per 
cent). Of those who showed no improvement, 86 percent had 
no formal training or only basic training.
Table 4-4 shows the percentages, by personal 
characteristics, of those who were judged not to have im 
proved their labor market potential as a result of having a 
PSE job relative to the percentage with that characteristic for 
the total sample. Males, minorities, and those not receiving 
AFDC were less likely to have improved their labor market 
potential. We found no significant differences between types 
of jurisdictions. When we compared types of PSE 
employers, the only difference we found was that par 
ticipants employed in nonprofit organizations had a slightly 
higher change of improving employability.
Given the low level of formal training for most par 
ticipants (a majority got one day or less), the estimated
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positive impact on job market potential suggests that infor 
mal OJT remains an important part of the training in PSE.
Table 4-4
Characteristics of Participants
Not Improving Labor Market Potential
and Percentages of Total Sample
Not improving labor Total 
_____Characteristic________market potential___sample
Sex 
Male ........................ 64 51
Female ...................... 36 49
Race 
White ....................... 35 47
Nonwhite .................... 65 53
Age 
Under 22 years................ 24 24
22-45 years ................... 57 63
More than 45 years ............ 18 12
Years of schooling 
Less than 12 .................. 43 33
12........................... 38 42
More than 12 ................. 19 24
Member of family receiving AFDC 
Yes.......................... 23 32
No .......................... 77 67
Overall average, total sample .. 12 100
The chance that PSE participants would be hired by the 
agency in which they worked during their program involve 
ment, which we call direct absorption, has always been an 
important feature of PSE. In the 1980-81 study round, direct 
absorption was considered highly likely for only 20 percent 
of the training sample. Females, whites, and persons be 
tween 22 and 44 years of age had a greater likelihood of
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direct absorption than males, nonwhites, and the younger or 
older participants. Before the 1978 amendments, when the 
chief local objectives for PSE were the provision of public 
services and fiscal relief, direct absorption was probably 
much higher. In fact, in earlier rounds we found that a major 
criterion for allocating PSE slots was the potential for direct 
absorption. But the targeting, wage, and tenure limitations 
of the 1978 amendments reduced the incentive for many of 
these agencies to participate in the program. The declining 
direct absorption rate seems to have resulted from local 
governments' difficulty in creating positions that were useful 
to them but still met the federal requirements.
Even so, the most common experience for PSE par 
ticipants who entered employment immediately after leaving 
the program was to find a job in the agency that had 
employed them while in the program. In the third round of 
the study we found that in three-quarters of the sample 
jurisdictions, retention of PSE participants by employing 
agencies was the most common type of job placement for 
former participants. This finding is supported by the Con 
tinuous Longitudinal Manpower Survey (CLMS), sponsored 
by the U.S. Department of Labor, which found that 78 per 
cent of a 1975 cohort of participants who were employed im 
mediately after termination had located jobs in the public 
sector.
On balance it does not appear that the program design 
mixing formal training and public service jobs was very suc 
cessful. However, there were so many changes in PSE during 
this period that it would not be appropriate to conclude that 
it has no promise. Many of the field associates felt that if it 
had been given time and if employers had had a little more 
latitude in the creation of jobs and selection of participants, 
the 1979-80 version of PSE may have been a good approach 
to training. Almost before it was in place there were rumors 
of more reductions and changes. Therefore, we cannot be 
certain of the consequences of such a program had it been in-
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itiated with full government support and kept in place long 
enough to work out some of the problems.
We did learn that many participants wanted the jobs but 
not the training. They did not feel that the short training 
courses offered in most areas would be of much value. 
Another problem arose because employers did not want to 
bother with employees whose work schedule had to be 
especially arranged to accommodate training. For these and 
other reasons, the program simply failed to generate the 
energy and enthusiasm that was characteristic of PSE in 
1976-78.
Conclusion
Many of the findings about PSE as a training program are 
not surprising. Since PSE was employment, the most impor 
tant training was obtained on the job. The amount and 
quality of training depended on the nature of the job, the 
preparation and attitude of the employee, and the impor 
tance attached to the job by the employer. Getting the right 
mix of these factors proved difficult. We concluded that the 
early PSE program, before 1976, failed as a training pro 
gram chiefly because most of the employees did not need 
training. Also, we feel that the program after 1978 was not 
very successful because the jobs had too little skill content, 
the participants were not prepared for training, and the 
employers did not care much about the outcome.
For the interim period, 1976-78, PSE gets relatively high 
marks as a training program. Somewhat ironically, this was 
a period when training was a secondary objective and job 
creation was the major purpose. We learn from this ex 
perience that creation of a training environment requires at 
tention to all of the necessary components. Almost by acci 
dent, there was in 1976-78 a good pool of trainees, real and 
important jobs to be learned, and employers who cared 
about getting the workers trained. While it may have been 
admirable to attempt to push the program to a more disad-
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vantaged population or to save money by limiting the max 
imum wage, PSE should be seen as an entity where all the 
characteristics were interdependent. This institutional or 
holistic approach to the analysis does not yield startling 
results but provides conclusions that apparently were not 
foreseen by those policymakers who, for ten years, seemed 
to tamper with the program on the assumption that they 
could change one program aspect at a time.
A program such as PSE can provide training if we do not 
burden the program by asking it to serve incompatible objec 
tives. While it will never be the best program for the most 
disadvantaged, there are many others who need job training, 
work experience, and an opportunity for upward mobility. 
During the 1970s and early 1980s when unemployment rates 
stayed at historically high levels, the opportunities for job 
shifting and upward mobility were very limited, especially 
for the semiskilled, dislocated workers, and young entrants 
to the labor force. Also, none of our current labor market 
policies specifically addresses this growing problem.
NOTES
1. Westate, Inc., Net Impact Report No. 1 (Supplement No. 1), The Im 
pact of CETA on 1978 Earnings: Participants in Selected Program Ac 
tivities Who Entered CETA During FY1976, Office of Program Evalua 
tion, U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, July 1982, Table 3-1, pp. 
3-9.
2. The notion of labor market layers is developed in Public Service 
Employment: A Field Evaluation by Richard P. Nathan, Robert F. 
Cook, and V. Lane Rawlins. The Brookings Institution, 1981, pp. 37-38.
3. It should be noted that some of these results may be affected by the 
way in which the sample was drawn. The sample was made up of par 
ticipants who had not terminated by December 31, 1980. Therefore, 
training that tends to be up front (such as orientation or basic skills) may 
be accurately reported, while back-end training (such as job search skills) 
may be somewhat underreported. Similarly, the amount of longer term 
training (skill or general) may be understated.
5
Conclusions
Local experience with public service employment differed 
in many ways owing to differences in size and fiscal condi 
tions of localities as well as to the personalities of program 
managers. In one rural southern site, the PSE program was 
shaped by a CETA director who personally knew every 
employer and PSE participant; in large cities, by contrast, 
PSE was run by sizable bureaucracies. In one county the 
board of commissioners became directly involved in PSE to 
the point that jobs were filled with an eye to political impact. 
There were also reports of political abuse. In most areas, 
however, the goals of providing services and helping par 
ticipants took precedence over heavy handed political expe 
diency.
This diversity added interest to our study. Some of the 
most interesting and valuable learning took place at the 
periodic conferences of associates where first-hand accounts 
were given of how the program was working in southern 
Florida, Houston, Chicago, Los Angeles, rural Mississippi, 
Maine, California, Oregon, South Dakota, and the variety 
of other places initially identified only by pins on a wall map.
Despite this variety, the similarities in responses to policy 
changes analyzed over four rounds of field observations 
were significant. Now that the PSE experiment is over, at 
least for the moment, we feel that these patterns allow us to 
draw some conclusions about the efficacy of public service 
employment under a variety of program designs and 
economic conditions. This chapter presents a brief summary
125
126 Conclusions
of those conclusions, along with some observations about 
the future role of public service employment.
Our first observation is that even a very decentralized pro 
gram operated by states and localities is quite responsive to 
major changes in direction at the federal level. As noted in 
chapter 1, the relative emphasis on various aspects of PSE 
varied considerably over time. Prior to 1976, the program 
was simply an optional CETA training program. Guidelines 
on the length of time that a person could participate in the 
program and limitations on wages that could be paid were 
liberal enough to allow good public service jobs with 
substantial tenure. The relatively lax standards on partici 
pant eligibility meant that state and local governments could 
use PSE to augment their regular workforce. Also, the 
potential for substitution of federal for state and local 
dollars was quite high.
Our study began in 1977 and coincided with a massive ex 
pansion of PSE for countercyclical purposes. While there is 
some question about the degree to which the program in this 
phase reached the economically disadvantaged, there is no 
doubt about the magnitude of the expansion or that state 
and local governments were able and willing to fill virtually 
all of the slots allotted to them by the federal government. 
Unlike traditional employment and training programs of the 
past, this buildup took place in an environment of excite 
ment and energy. PSE was an opportunity for state and local 
governments to substantially increase government services 
without raising taxes, a feature that made it very attractive.
Because of the countercyclical emphasis of the program 
during this period, much attention was given to the question 
of displacement—the extent to which state and local govern 
ments used PSE in place of locally generated revenue. A 
crucial aspect of program effectiveness, this issue dominated 
the first two rounds of our study.
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The key to this aspect of the field research was the 
development of a conceptual framework capable of captur 
ing the ways in which job creation and displacement 
manifested themselves within the employment patterns of 
sponsoring agencies of government and nonprofit organiza 
tions. Within the established framework, the PSE employ 
ment process was analyzed in each of the sample jurisdic 
tions, sometimes on a position-by-position basis. Estimates 
of displacement were particularly difficult to make where the 
essential question was whether an established position would 
have been abolished if it were not funded by PSE. This issue 
was most often faced in the larger cities of the Northeast and 
Midwest because so many of them were under extreme fiscal 
stress. It was the judgment of the field researchers in these 
areas that many positions funded by PSE in regular govern 
ment activities were not displacement because those posi 
tions would have been eliminated had PSE funds not been 
available. The name we gave to this type of job creation was 
"program maintenance," and it proved a significant and in 
herently controversial component in measuring job creation.
Our findings indicated that the degree of displacement was 
much lower than others had predicted and, in fact, much 
lower than even some of us suspected prior to the study. On 
average, the displacement rate was about 20 percent, varying 
from almost zero to nearly 60 percent across jurisdictions. 
Rather than rising over time as some had predicted, the 
displacement rate was found to decline. We suspect that 
under a stable program, displacement rates would have in 
creased as time passed. However, PSE was never stable and 
the trend toward a more tightly controlled program, par 
ticularly in participant eligibility requirements and allowable 
wage rates, did not allow that hypothesis to be tested. In ef 
fect, shifts over time dominated any movement toward a 
long term static equilibrium.
By the nature of the field research, we were also able to 
identify a benefit from PSE that was largely overlooked by
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national policymakers who focused primarily on the employ 
ment and training aspects of the program. That benefit was 
the value of the services provided by PSE and the importance 
of these services to local program operators. PSE workers 
did everything from providing library services to initiating 
"meals on wheels" programs for the aged. They were engag 
ed in rat control programs in the cities, emergency medical 
services, park renovation, jogging trail construction, road 
repair, trail building, weed control, and record system 
modernization. The complete list for our sample jurisdic 
tions is far'too long to reproduce here.
It can be argued that these activities were marginal and of 
low value, a conclusion based on the notion that taxpayers 
did not care enough to pay for them with local tax money. 
That hypothesis is not directly testable, assumes stable 
priorities, and ignores demonstration effects. PSE allowed 
state and local officials the flexibility to direct marginal 
resources to the areas that they saw as most important. Many 
of these activities were continued after the PSE program 
ended.
Toward the end of the decade, when tighter restrictions on 
wages and participant eligibility limited the range of services 
that could be provided, we found that the program had lost 
much of its appeal to state and local officials. It is mainly 
because of this change that the Reagan administration's 1981 
proposal to eliminate PSE was not more vigorously opposed. 
We suggest, therefore, that in future public policy delibera 
tions over public service employment, explicit attention be 
paid to the types of services that PSE workers can provide; 
that some estimate of the value of these services be included 
in the benefit-cost calculation of such a program.
The training issue was the most difficult aspect of PSE to 
assess. In retrospect, it seems unfortunate that the informal 
training obtained by PSE participants in the regular perfor 
mance of their public service jobs was largely overlooked as 
a positive aspect of the program. The difficulty in quantify-
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ing these training effects was undoubtedly one reason that 
greater emphasis was put on more formal and more costly 
classroom training during the last phase of the program. By 
contrast, only a very small percent of the money was 
allocated to formal training during the early countercyclical 
period of PSE, 1976-78. Yet the informal training aspects of 
PSE had an effect, as now confirmed by a study of the net 
earnings impact of the program, showing the earning gains 
by PSE participants equal to the average for all CETA pro 
grams.
It is our conclusion that PSE is an inappropriate program 
for those lacking basic skills, since the very concept of the 
program implies that a participant is capable of at least 
minimal job performance. However, on-the-job training 
provided in a regular job is useful for those with limited 
work experience, those who are re-entering the labor force, 
and those who have been displaced or dislocated by 
technological or economic change.
Another important program impact that is difficult to 
document and disentangle from other events during this time 
is the effect of PSE on the composition of the state and local 
government workforce. Because of the subsidies involved, 
PSE provided an incentive for governments to lower the 
education requirements for some positions, to employ 
women in traditionally male occupations, and to break down 
job entry barriers for minority groups. In several of our sam 
ple governments, we found that the wage subsidy was suffi 
cient to cause even the most hardened personnel directors to 
consider changing some of their most discriminatory 
policies. There is also evidence that many "disadvantaged" 
PSE participants retained public sector jobs after they left 
the PSE program. We firmly believe that this experience 
helped remove some of the traditional obstacles to employ 
ment faced by those lacking educational credentials and by 
women and minorities and that this will be one of the most 
lasting impacts of the PSE program.
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With all that's been learned, does PSE deserve a place 
among national policy options for increasing employment 
and providing equal opportunity? We firmly believe that it 
does. However, as suggested at the beginning of this book, 
PSE is not the elixir for all ailments, or even several at the 
same time. It does not seem to be appropriate for the most 
seriously disadvantaged, nor is it appropriate for those who 
are only temporarily inconvenienced by unemployment. It is, 
however, a program with great potential for those who are 
able to work and need job experience.
PSE should be administered subject to certain conditions. 
First, it should be prescribed for a limited period of time to 
avoid dependence by participants and excessive substitution 
by local governments and other employing agencies. Second, 
assuming that PSE participants are more disadvantaged than 
those who would normally receive on-the-job training in 
private sector positions, a case can be made for a higher sub 
sidy rate and a longer tenure than the standard 50 percent 
wage subsidy, 6-month private sector OJT contract. The 
one-year limitation in the post-1978 PSE program seemed to 
have worked effectively in this regard.
Third, some limit should be placed on the maximum wage 
subsidy from federal funds both to control program costs 
and to assure that participants have an incentive to seek 
other employment. However, we do not support a limit on 
the ability of local governments to supplement the PSE max 
imum. We found no relation between local supplementation 
and displacement, and, in some cases, local areas were will 
ing to create a job only if wages were sufficient to employ 
suitably qualified workers. Moreover, if combined with a 
limit on program tenure, such supplementation should not 
create a disincentive to find unsubsidized employment.
Fourth, because PSE is appropriately targeted on those 
who need work experience and on-the-job training but who 
are capable of holding a job at the outset of participation, we 
conclude that program eligibility criteria should be establish-
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ed in terms of labor market characteristics or labor market 
disadvantage rather than personal characteristics. Eligibility 
criteria should be defined by income level and employment 
experience rather than race, sex, age, or education. Educa 
tion, however, is sufficiently correlated with labor market 
disadvantage that those without a high school degree will 
represent a significant segment of the eligible population.
Finally, effective implementation of a locally administered 
program like PSE requires sensitivity to the objectives of 
local program operators. Without recognizing this vital 
aspect of program design, it is unlikely that any future PSE 
initiative will succeed. The experience of the 1970s provides 
clear instruction about incentives associated with public ser 
vice employment and essential design criteria to reach pro 
gram goals. In this nation of diversity there is at least one 
constant across all areas; namely, everyone is looking for a 
bargain. Our research indicates that, if properly designed, 
PSE can provide employment and training for participants, 
some easing of the twin demands for tax relief and additional 
services from state and local governments, and progress 
toward the federal goals of expanded employment, equal op 
portunity, and a better-trained workforce. That's a pretty 
good bargain, with one important caveat. As any one party 
to the bargain tries to get too much, it is likely to undermine 
the entire process.
While any new public employment program must be 
carefully designed and planned, the concept itself remains 
viable. For as long as there is concern about unemployment 
and untrained workers, there is a policy role for public ser 
vice employment.
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